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Introduction: Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna 
In the early morning of September 21, 1809, Robert Stewart Castlereagh and 
George Canning traveled their separate ways to Lord Yarmouth’s cottage on Putney 
Heath in England. They scheduled their rendezvous for 6 a.m. that morning; as such, they 
were up before the dawn and on their way, pistols and shot in tow. While thoroughly 
macabre, the fact that their shared mentor William Pitt had died within sight of the 
cottage in January of 1806 made it a fitting location for their duel that morning. Stewart’s 
cousin Yarmouth went with him, humming snippets from a contemporary piece of music, 
Madame Angelica Catalani’s latest performance. They met with Canning and his second, 
Charles Ellis, at the cottage. Stepping aside from their principals, Yarmouth and Ellis 
made one final attempt at mediation between the two statesmen. Ellis stated that the 
matter that Canning concealed had been on the command of the King and that Canning 
himself had disliked the necessary deceit of Stewart; however, this equivocation did not 
placate Stewarts wounded pride.1  While Castlereagh had fought a duel before in his 
youth in Ireland, Canning had never fired a shot in his life. As the appointed time 
approached, the men readied their pistols and took their marks. They both walked ten 
paces and, then turned: 
From April to October in 1805 the War of the Fifth Coalition waged across 
Europe with Britain, Austria, and its allies fighting against the empire of Napoleon.2  
                                                          
1
 Edward Cooke, Downing Street, To Charles Stewart, 21 September 1809, Castlereagh Papers, 
MIC570/16 [D3030/Q3]. 
Thomas Moore to Miss Godfrey, 30 August 1807, in Memories, Journal and Correspondence of Thomas 
Moore, edited and abridged from the first edition by the Right Hon. Lord Russel, MP (Longman: London, 
1860), 69. 
John Bew, Castlereagh: A Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 261. 
2
 While some authors specifically make reference to London, or English influence, this thesis will use the 
phrase “British”. This is not to say that there was an absolute consensus between England and Scotland nor 
to undermine the agency and conflict in portions of Ireland. "British" highlights that increasing view of 
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While men died in Spain, Italy, and Germany, Castlereagh and Canning fought their duel 
of public and private honor on a sward of grass in England. That two heirs of Pitt came to 
such a row while the fate of Europe hung in the balance echoed the worst absurdities of 
classical tragedy, hubris, and vainglory in the midst of war. It also showed the personal 
nature of national and international politics. The flash of sword and roar of cannon 
decided the fate of Europe’s wars, but the matters of peace rested on the individual 
qualities of statesmen. While Castlereagh fought a duel of private honor in Putney Heath 
and a war against Napoleon around Europe, his more important battle would take place 
five years later at Vienna. It was there that he fought against his peers to establish a 
lasting peace in Europe. 
At the Congress of Vienna from September 1814 to June 1815, Stewart, the 
second Marquees of Londonderry and Viscount Castlereagh, succeeded in encircling 
France with a cordon of strong states that could better resist the possibility of future 
French military aggression. He conceived these goals with an eye towards European 
balance of power, strategically resettling European borders and placating allies when 
necessary. He guarded against the advances of France and Russia through the 
strengthening of the Low Countries, resettlement of Norway from Denmark to Sweden, 
the restructuring of a more resilient Italian Peninsula, and the division of Poland and 
Saxony along the convoluted borders between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Castlereagh, 
of course, held ideological leanings, but his principle purpose was neither the 
preservation of absolute monarchy or ancien regime, nor a more liberal sentiment for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
statesmen in London that while they did have interests in their private holdings, there remained larger 
interests in the British Isles and the burgeoning Empire. 
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self-determination. His goal was to bring peace to Europe through strategic realism in the 
peacemaking process.  
After the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the victorious march of the Allied 
Coalition into Paris, the Great Powers faced the difficult position of restoring a shattered 
and weary Europe. Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and wayward France met at 
Vienna to discuss the fate of Europe and the resettlement of national borders. Due to his 
familiarity with continental diplomatic figures from his time in the War Department and 
Foreign Office, the British government sent Castlereagh. He had previously helped 
arrange and execute multiple coalitions arrayed against Napoleon, built Britain’s army up 
to an unprecedented size, and worked closely with Sir Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of 
Wellington, in his Peninsular Campaign. Outside of continental Europe, Castlereagh 
crushed an uprising in Ireland, led a secondary war against the United States, and helped 
bring about the end of the Atlantic Slave Trade. Rather from these triumphs, 
Castlereagh’s fame springs from his exploits at the Congress of Vienna and the part he 
played in a peace settlement that directed the nature of European power politics for the 
next century. In the ‘Long Century” of peace that followed, much of the criticism of 
Castlereagh came from the British public itself, who thought his conservativism made 
him subservient to foreign autocracy. After the apparent failure of the Concert of Europe3 
in the Great War, popular British perception of Castlereagh as an arch-conservative 
spread abroad as disenchanted Europeans heaped criticism upon him and his 
Congressional peers.4 
                                                          
3
 The Concert of Europe was another term for the Congress system that sprung from the Congress of 
Vienna. The term and conception of the Concert, an idea that the states of Europe acted together, lasted 
long after the Great Powers stopped meeting in Congresses. 
4
 Bew, XXVII-XXX. 
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While his balance of power goals at Vienna were a success, Castlereagh did not 
embrace the conservative ideology of his diplomatic peers; he instead sought European 
security. He disapproved of the Holy Alliance and the Troppau Protocol that drew 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia into an ever closer union. Still, his balance of power system 
did not fail in the midst of the widening ideological gap between Britain and the 
Continent. The Concert endured in some capacity through the revolts in Spain, Latin 
America, and Ottoman Greece, as well as through the European Revolutions of 1848. The 
Crimean War eventually shattered the general peace between the Great Powers. This 
breakdown in European peace does not shear Castlereagh of his success in surrounding 
France with military and diplomatic barriers succeeded long after the members of the 
Coalition had gone their separate ways. Rather, his goal was to achieve a peace in 
Europe—as long as he could—through the realistic checking of France and balancing of 
other Powers’ interests. 
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
The outbreak of the French Revolution caught most of the states of Europe by 
surprise. While there had been contests in Europe between the rights of the aristocracy 
and the monarchy, the attack on the Bastille and the seizure of the royal family were a 
different sort of event altogether. The Revolution was not just an uprising by peasants 
upset with the temporary disruption of their rights or a mob of the hungry; the ideological 
origins of the French Revolution were the tenants of humanism and liberalism 
brandishing teeth. However, Prussia and Austria took to the field to aggrandize their 
interests and prestige. While figures in Britain were concerned with the disorder and 
conflict, they did not take military action until Revolutionary seizure of the Low 
                                                                                                                                                                             
David Gates, The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815 ( New York: Arnold, 1997), 171-196. 
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Countries. France achieved mixed success with the mass conscriptions of men and 
material via the levee en masse, but they failed to make deep inroads across the Rhine 
into Germany. The rise and exploits of the young Corsican general Napoleon Bonaparte 
in Northern Italy drastically changed the nature of the conflict, as did his further victories 
for the French republic.5  
While Napoleon won renown for invading Italy, Egypt, and Germany, his most 
resounding successes were the war he waged against his own people, his seizure of the 
throne as Emperor in December 1804, his fashioning of a proto-police state, and the 
power he wielded over Europe at the expense of his subjects. In the following decade, 
several different coalitions of Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia led by William Pitt or 
Castlereagh contended against Napoleon. Though these were valiant efforts, they often 
failed due to an inability of the Allies to bring concerted military forces to bear against 
Napoleon, the inconstancy of the Allies, and the economic difficulty in financing the 
wars. The First Coalition began in 1792 when Prussia joined Austria, who was already at 
war with Revolutionary France. France suffered multiple invasions and an occupation of 
Toulon by Britain. The Coalition ended with the ceding of the Austrian Netherlands to 
France and Napoleon's victory in Northern Italy. Britain alone remained in conflict with 
France through 1797.  
                                                          
5
 Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution / by Georges Lefebvre; Translated and with a 
Preface by R.R. Palmer (Princeton, N.J; Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-3. 49-72, 93-107, 183-189, 
207-218. 
Frank A. Kafker and James Michael Laux, The French Revolution: Conflicting Interpretations (New York: 
Random House, 1968), 1-56. 
William Farr Church, The Influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolution, 2d ed. Problems in 
European Civilization (Lexington, Mass; D. C. Heath, 1973), 183-194. 
Bailey Stone, The Genesis of the French Revolution: A Global-Historical Interpretation (Cambridge 
England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 196-235. 
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The Second Coalition, formed in 1799, traded Prussian soldiers for Russian. Both 
Russia and Austria both raised arms for conflict in Germany and Italy, while Napoleon 
returned from his exploits in Egypt. Although the coalition enjoyed some victories, it fell 
apart in 1802 when Russia left due to disagreements with Britain over Russian nautical 
privileges. Britain, Austria, and Russia dominated the Third Coalition in the conflict that 
broke out the following year. From 1803-1805, Britain stood under the constant threat of 
invasion. It was only after the battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 that Britain eliminated 
any threat of French troops crossing the Channel. On the Continent, things went poorly 
for the coalition as Napoleon performed a massive sweeping maneuver that caught an 
Austrian army by surprise. Napoleon followed up with his greatest success, the battle of 
Austerlitz, in which he defeated a combined Russo-Austrian force under the personal 
command of Tsar Alexander. Napoleon also used this time to set up the Confederacy of 
the Rhine as his own satellites in the former Holy Roman Empire.6 
The Fourth Coalition, occurring from 1806-1807, was made of Prussian, Russian 
and British forces. Prussia joined the coalition in fear of Napoleon’s growing influence in 
Central Germany and then massed its forces in Saxony. Napoleon crushed Prussia in a 
lightning campaigns and eventually wore Russia down in a series of clashes. Through 
these successes, Napoleon annexed huge swathes of Prussian territory and forced Russia 
into the Continental System to choke Britain of its European trade. The Fifth Coalition 
began in 1809, pitting Austria and Britain against France. Austria contended with France 
in Central Europe while Britain increased pressure on France in Spain through the 
Peninsular Campaign led by Arthur Wellesley. Britain suffered failure in the Walcheren 
Expedition, and Austrian forces suffered defeated at the hands of France at the battle of 
                                                          
6
 Gates, 15-37, 49-82,196-264. 
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Wargram. A significant amount of Austrian territory was transferred to strengthen France 
and its allies.  
The final coalition included Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The fruit of 
Castlereagh’s diplomatic skill, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and several of the smaller 
German states, marched with them. This coalition became possible after Napoleon’s 
failed invasion of Russia to compel maintenance of the blockade of British goods. 
Military defeat and a long retreat from Moscow destroyed the most experienced members 
of Napoleon’s armies, allowed Austria to disentangle itself from a forced alliance, and 
prompted nationalist sentiment against Napoleon all over Europe. The defining battle of 
the campaign was the Battle of Leipzig, the largest battle in European history before the 
Great War. Napoleon was defeated, and he fought a rearguard action until his eventual 
abdication after the Allies took Paris.7 
The Congress of Vienna did not suddenly spring out of the diplomatic ether after 
the defeat of Napoleon; it appeared organically through military and diplomatic necessity. 
Castlereagh’s initial mission to the Continent was to use seized colonial possessions to 
secure Belgium from French military control and influence and consolidate an Alliance 
that would endure after the defeat of Napoleon.8 The Treaty of Chaumont was the first 
step towards the Congress of Vienna. At Chaumont, Castlereagh said,  
My own impression is, as it has always been, that whilst anything of an army 
remains to him [Napoleon] will not easily submit to sign such a peace as the 
Allies require; and I am induced to believe he will put his main resistance upon 
Antwerp, 1st, as the point of most pride as well as power, and, 2ndly, as that 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., 100-141. 
8
 Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of 
Europe (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 1931), 192-195. 
Memorandum of Cabinet, December, 26th, 1813 from Charles K. Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815 
(London: G. Bell and sons ltd. 1921), 123-126. 
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interest in support of which he expects the continental Powers will be least 
disposed to continue the war.9 
 
Their successes or failures aside, the other coalitions up to this point were limited in 
scope. The defeat of Napoleon, while a lofty goal for a coalition, was only a part of the 
Treaty of Chaumont. The purpose of the Treaty was to bind Britain, Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia together beyond the defeat of Napoleon. For the present war, each Power 
provided 150,000 men or comparable subsidies, but the longer plans of the Quadruple 
Alliance remained for twenty years and guaranteed each of the signatories’ security 
against France with a compulsory force of 60,000 soldiers.10  This alliance was a sword 
set against France, but one of Castlereagh’s goals was to make the drawing of this blade 
unnecessary. 
Initial attempts at settlement among the Great Powers at Paris failed due to the 
patriotic fervor of the French people, the distracting decadence of the city, and the 
intemperate boasts of Tsar Alexander. An example of this lack of circumspection by 
Alexander was his unilateral decision to settle Napoleon Bonaparte on the Island of Elba 
with his honors intact. A second attempt to settle matters in London also failed when 
Alexander alienated the Prince Regent and much of Parliament. The settlement moved to 
the secondary cultural center of Europe, Vienna. The home of the ancient Hapsburg 
Monarchy, Vienna made sense as an appropriate site for deliberation. The Allies 
eventually formalized their monopoly on the deliberation of the proceedings by keeping 
all territorial distribution decisions unto themselves, but also sought the support of France 
and Spain. Smaller states that sent representatives to Vienna waited on the sidelines as 
                                                          
9
 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 3, 1814: B.D. 163; March 4, 1814: F.O. Continent, 3. from Webster, The 
Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe, 227. 
10
 Ibid., 227. 
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the larger states determined their fates. While the operations of the large states kept the 
smaller states of Europe from enjoying the fruits of sovereignty, it allowed the resolution 
of larger settlements concerns.11  
Talleyrand attempted to disrupt proceedings by appealing to a European wide 
participation in the Congress, but his appeal only gave rise to the Committee of Eight and 
a Special Committee of five German powers. The former was a lightning rod, a show that 
the Congress had greater European legitimacy than the domination of Great Powers in the 
proceedings allowed. It was this group, not the Committee of Four, that called for 
hostilities against Napoleon in the Hundred Days.12  The latter Committee rose to the task 
of drafting a constitution for a German Federation, though the Committee did suffer due 
to initial animosity between Prussia and Austria, as well as similar relations between 
smaller states like Wuttenburg and Bavaria.13 
While some of Castlereagh’s contemporaries attributed his actions at the Congress 
of Vienna to a desire to reinforce conservative ideological goals or personal pretensions 
of continental prestige, this interpretation ignores his strategic goals at the Congress.14 
Following the upheavals of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, Castlereagh 
succeeded in surrounding France with states that could better resist French military 
aggression. While he built up the Low Countries and Piedmont-Sardinia, he carefully 
rearranged the borders of lesser Italian states, Norway, Poland, and Saxony. Castlereagh 
                                                          
11
  Charles K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963), 79-88. 
It was this seizure of authority that marked the full recognition of the “Great Powers” as states 
fundamentally different from smaller European states. 
12
 Ibid., 95, 155. 
13
 Ibid., 84, 148-149. 
14
 Many of Castlereagh’s contemporaries and successors made such an accusation. For a particularly useful 
source on the motivations of Castlereagh and a fuller context of his academic and diplomatic background, 
see John Bew’s Castlereagh: A Life.  
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held ideological presumptions, but his principle purpose was to bring peace to Europe by 
focusing on diplomatic and strategic realities. 
Difficulty With Sources  
 While Castlereagh has left behind many documents through the materials 
arranged by his brother or the official communiqués, reports, and instructions from the 
War Department, Foreign Office, and Parliament, there are significant gaps in the 
sources. Castlereagh provided materials for his colleagues in the Netherlands, Italy, 
London, Vienna, and Moscow. He meticulously preserved his notes during the Congress 
itself from outside misuse. Prince Metternich’s spy service was in full force at Vienna, 
and so Castlereagh often destroyed his documents, kept things under lock and key, and 
used his own staff brought from England in lieu of compromised local staff at Vienna. 
While there is access to some of his materials, a good deal of the scholarship on Vienna 
relies on what Castlereagh planned before the Congress, what he said about it afterwards, 
and his private communications with peers around Europe. While it would of course be 
better to have Castlereagh’s notes from the Congress as the proceedings occurred, it is 
possible to put together his views on balance of power and settlement from other sources. 
The principle primary sources of Castlereagh are the collections from the Foreign 
Office, the Castlereagh Papers, and The Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers 
of Viscount Castlereagh put together by his younger brother Charles William Vane. 
These sources are in no way exhaustive of the political culture of Europe, of Britain, or of 
Castlereagh himself, but they serve as an excellent framework to introduce the researcher 
to Castlereagh’s policies for peace in Europe.15 
                                                          
15
 Enno Kraehe wisely pointed out the limited usefulness of a paper on the Congress and larger European 
diplomacy that does not use all the diplomatic sources available. For the limited scope of this work 
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Chapter One 
The Historiography of the Congress of Vienna 
The Congress of Vienna has long been of importance to historians and statesmen 
as a guiding star of diplomatic communication or a warning on the dangers of an 
aggrandizing peace. Three authors stand out as particularly influential in the diplomatic 
historiography of Castlereagh. Charles Webster, Harold Temperley, and Henry Kissinger 
all wrote on the diplomatic goals of Castlereagh at Vienna. While their works set the pace 
for all future discussions of Castlereagh’s diplomacy, they are not without omissions or 
faults. While Webster and Temperley wrote between the First World War and the end of 
the Second, the continued attempts at balance of power during the Cold War influenced 
Kissinger’s A World Restored. Kissinger’s work grappled with balance of power issues, 
but Edward Guilick, Harold Nicolson, and Paul Schroeder further pursued the topic of the 
Congress and Castlereagh’s policy for peacemaking, but they often failed to grasp the 
vision of their predecessors or fully address the nature of the diplomats at the Congress—
their education, ideology, and goals. While Gulick, Nicolson, and Schroeder wrote during 
the Cold War, and their writings do reflect that background, the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with another trend in historical research.  
By the 1990s, the growing popularity of social history and a move a more 
nuanced form of biography took the academic and the general reader into the mind of the 
statesmen at Vienna—Castlereagh not the least. David King pursued a detailed history of 
the decadence of the Congress, and Adam Zamoyski made the first great move to the 
popular political account of the Congress of Vienna. While King’s work suffered from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
however, more particular sources and research were used with Castlereagh as the object and not as a 
diplomatic coincidental. 
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flippancy about diplomatic affairs, and the issue of Polish nationalism stilts Zamoysky’s 
work, both succeed in moving Castlereagh from the sole province of diplomatic 
historians and statesmen to the attention of the general reading public. John Bew’s recent 
biography made use of a firm understanding of European ideology, diplomatic realism, 
and Castlereagh’s background to paint a full picture of Castlereagh’s diplomatic and 
personal motivations—culminating with the diplomatic realism and popular historical 
approach of his predecessors. In spite of several excellent texts, many historians disregard 
details on Castlereagh’s approach to nationalism and his general ideology. Castlereagh’s 
legacy from the Congress of Vienna is undoubtedly complex, but a clear understanding of 
the diplomatic background in which he labored and his own internal struggles are 
necessary context to understand his realistic goals at the Vienna peace settlement.  
 The three most important authors on Castlereagh’s diplomatic history are Charles 
Webster, Harold Temperley, and Henry Kissinger. Webster and Temperley share an 
academic and professional background in interwar England, while Kissinger was an 
academic and statesmen of a singularly different nature. Webster and Temperley wrote 
several books on the diplomacy of Britain, which involved Castlereagh, but their own 
fears and concerns of interwar Europe had some influence on their work. Instead of the 
prosecution of the war against Napoleon, both men spent a great deal more time 
discussing the efforts for achieving and maintaining peace. Webster wrote several books 
on the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh, but the most important works were his short 
texts on the bureaucratic structure of the Congress, The Congress of Vienna, and a pair of 
books on Castlereagh’s foreign policy from 1813-1822.16 The former covers the 
                                                          
16
 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815. 
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motivations of diplomats and the exchanges of territories, but the primary purpose of the 
text demonstrates the organization of the Congress. It did not just jump into the minds of 
the creators ex nihilo; it was a thoroughly organic process amongst the Great Powers. The 
structures of power and the diplomatic representation at the Congress changed with the 
movements against an enthroned Napoleon, the early fears over territorial settlements, 
and the pretensions of states and statesmen. His other two works, The Foreign Policy of 
Castlereagh 1812-1815 and The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822, were the 
fruit of his desire to gain a clearer understanding of the Congress System in Europe and 
what role Britain’s foreign policy played in its formation and maintenance.17 While the 
nature of international diplomacy and economics meant that Britain remained in contact 
with the Continent in the remainder of the 19th century, Webster believed that the 
connection between the common problems of Europe and Britain were closest at the 
close of the Napoleonic Wars.18 In regards to Castlereagh, Webster broke down his 
actions into two parts: the personal factors and changes in diplomacy that made the last 
great coalition possible, and Castlereagh's key role in the peace settlement.  
 Webster’s colleague in 19th century British diplomacy, Harold Temperley had a 
rather different appraisal of the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh, and the effects and 
significance of the Congress System.19 The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827 only 
briefly focuses on Castlereagh, but it was an important addition in the historiography of 
                                                          
17
 Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822 (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 
1925), v. 
Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe. 
18
 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822, vii. 
19
 The academic adversity of Webster in Canning is stuff of legend. Their rows may have something to do 
with their different backgrounds during World War II. Temperley served in the Foreign Office while 
Webster served in the War Department, curiously paralleling the careers of their subjects Canning and 
Castlereagh. 
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Castlereagh and the Congress.20 Temperley was one of the first historians to offer 
criticism of Castlereagh’s actions at the Congress and his reactions to the Holy Alliance 
without attributing it to starch conservatism. He treats the success of the Quadruple 
Alliance over Napoleon as their shining moment, a gilded accomplishment that tarnished 
in the suppression of liberal European ideology and the ideological division between the 
Allies.21 The seeds of the Allies’ failure were in how the different Powers looked at the 
fulfillment of treaties and a disagreement on the purpose of the Quadruple Alliance.22 In 
spite of Castlereagh’s disapproval of the suppression in Germany brought on by the 
Carlsbad Resolutions, he stood aside and did not press the issue. While Prince Clemens 
von Metternich desired a period of static peace, Castlereagh’s goal was a continuance of 
the Congress System.23 Without the danger of France, the Great Powers were able to go 
their own way on issues, and the discontent in British public opinion limited 
Castlereagh’s diplomatic freedom.  
 The fact that Webster and Temperley disagree on the nature of Castlereagh and 
Canning’s role at the Congress and larger European diplomacy is not particularly 
troubling. How different the men were in temperament and method of policy in spite of 
their similar backgrounds always attracts scholarly attention. Two things are sadly 
lacking from Webster and Termperley’s works: they do not make a clear connection 
between the private nature of individual statesmen and the larger political goals. Both 
Webster and Temperley provide details and analyses of Castlereagh’s life and diplomatic 
                                                          
20
 Harold William Vazeille Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827; England, the Neo-Holy 
Alliance and the New World (London: G. Bell and sons, ltd. 1925). 
21
 Ibid., 3-4. 
22
 Ibid., 4-5. The constant tension of Tsar Alexander’s desire for autocratic rule and the trappings of liberal 
ideology were a constant source of diplomatic and political angst. Temperley asserts that the revolutions of 
the 1820’s and his frustration with Poland ended this dichotomy. 
23
 Ibid., 8-9. 
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background, but they never make a clear connection between the events of his life and his 
later policies. Castlereagh’s tumultuous introduction into Irish politics, his early trip to 
Spa, and his service in the War Department and Foreign Office tempered his appraisal of 
the destruction and disorder of European warfare. While the dates and data are present for 
Webster and Temperley, they never draw the private man and his public policies to the 
point of reconciliation. 
The Great War tempered Webster’s and Temperley’s perspectives on the 
Congress, but the end of World War II and the rumblings of the Cold War influenced 
Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of 
Peace 1812-1822, first published in 1954. While his topic was the peace settlement, his 
own pressing interest in the uneasy détente between the United States and the Soviet 
Union colors his work. This preoccupation is clearly seen in his discussion of inherent 
obstacles between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. Their inability to 
accept each other’s political, social, or ideological framework as valid bars them from 
successful diplomatic discussions. They are unable to deal with particulars because of the 
assumption that the universals that either side supports are a ruse for self-
aggrandizement.24 More pressing is Kissinger’s discussion of Castlereagh’s goal to 
construct a balance of forces in the Continent and Metternich’s goal to buttress this 
equilibrium with enduring legitimacy.25 While Castlereagh looked to reduce France, 
Metternich wished to use Russia as a long-term check on French power.26 In spite of 
these different goals, both men walked a tightrope between their aspirations and either 
                                                          
24
 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22, 
Sentry Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). 
Ibid., 1-4. 
25
 Ibid., 6. 
26
 Ibid., 60. 
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creating a power vacuum in Western Europe or a Russian hegemony in Central Europe. 
According to Kissinger, the issue of justice, of a state’s own conception of its role and 
historical identity, limited the settlement of a lasting peace. Metternich and Castlereagh 
were able to overrule these issues for Austria and Britain, to achieve a lasting peace at the 
Congress of Vienna. Rather than cater only to the interests of their own states and then 
appeal to a balance, both statesmen willingly limited their nations for a larger goal.27 
Kissinger’s multiple parallels of the Cold War and the Congress of Vienna do not damage 
his scholarship, but they do undermine something in his overall argument. While 
Kissinger looked at the personalities and temperament of Castlereagh and Metternich, his 
work comes across as a species of structuralism. Kissinger did not assert that 
Castlereagh’s social background and economic concerns bound him in his policy making, 
but he could not break free from a rigid need for a balance of power in Europe. It seems 
that Kissinger saw a balance of power—with Austria at its center—as the only possible, 
advantageous diplomatic option. It was possible, indeed sought after by most of his peers 
in Britain, that Castlereagh would support a removal of Britain from the affairs of 
Europe; however Castlereagh did not see this option as tenable. Castlereagh achieved 
Britain’s immediate territorial concern for Hanover and the Low Countries at the Treaty 
of Paris. He had no need to get involved in lengthy and expensive obligations in Vienna. 
What he saw during his actions against Napoleon, the building of the last coalition, and 
the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont was an intrinsic connection between British 
interests and peace on the Continent. The goal of Castlereagh was not balance of power 
for its own sake, but a pursuit of British interest as well as European peace. 
 
                                                          
27
 Ibid., 145-147. 
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Castlereagh and the Balance of Power 
In order to understand the politics of Europe following the defeat of Napoleon and 
the nature of the arguments at the Congress of Vienna, one must have a basic 
understanding of the European states system and the nature of the Great Powers.28 The 
ancien regime in Europe was a collection of various dynastic rulers, long-term landed 
aristocrats, later merchant and administrative aristocrats, and various bureaucratic 
officials. The ancien regime embraced a large array of political forms ranging from 
liberal constitutional monarchies to conservative autocracies—and yet, they shared the 
cultural touchstones of manners, blood ties, a Christian background of one form or 
another, and a reverence for the classical Mediterranean empires.29 Out of the ever 
shifting conflicts in Europe formed five relatively comparable Great Powers: Great 
Britain with its burgeoning, far-flung economic empire; France with its historic desire for 
military and cultural hegemony on the Continent; Austria with its ancient prestige at the 
heart of its vast holdings spread throughout Europe; Russia as the rising player on the 
field with Asiatic, Levantine, and European interests; and Prussia with its recent rise to 
Great Power status due to the military expertise of Frederick the Great.30 States of all 
sizes and makeup filled Europe, but these five states surpassed all the rest. Other 
statesmen had proposed vast international coalitions and alliances—even William Pitt 
pursued this goal in his own fashion—but Castlereagh was the one who made it possible 
with his emphasis on concerted action, international guarantee, and his realistic 
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settlement at Vienna. It would take the closed nature of the Congress to make the 
demarcation of Great Power official, but the turmoil of the French Revolution and 
Napoleonic Wars served as a crucible to turn the Powers into the prime movers of 
authority and policy on the Continent.31 
 Between the Great Powers and the European state system there was no invisible 
hand of moving about states, but rather deliberate actions of rulers and statesmen in 
response to a preponderance of power. Europe was not a self-correcting power system, 
but it did tend to abhor hegemony. The size of the Great Powers, the existence of sections 
of territory within Europe and abroad that could easily change hands, and the long history 
of the governing dynasties encouraged the predatory system in which the Great Powers 
fought, but it did not drive them to push one another into oblivion. Some early coalitions 
formed to seize territory, but some came about due to fear of the Hapsburgs or France 
creating a hegemonic power in Europe, the material realities of conquest, and a shared 
background amongst the Great Powers.32 The Great Powers actively resisted any change 
that would build a hegemonic state that could threaten their own sovereignty. Balance of 
power was not an eternal peace—it was balance through constant conflict. Warfare was a 
constant in the 300 years before the French Revolution due to the Great Powers’ need for 
security, against their peers. Beneath this conflict was a desire for security and a need to 
limit the rise of a hegemonic power, which doomed Europe to near perpetual warfare. It 
would take the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire to change that. 
Castlereagh’s early tutelage under William Pitt and the military support of Arthur 
Wellesley were of the utmost importance to his understanding of balance of power issues. 
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 Kissinger wrote on the balance of power, but other authors pursued it in order to 
focus more intently on specific issues in maintaining equilibrium between states. Some 
pursued a limited view on particular issues—with mixed results—while other enriched 
the field with broad studies that placed the actions of Castlereagh in a broader context. 
Edward Gulick’s Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, published in 1955, deals with 
misconceptions and realities of the European states’ approach to diplomacy and war. 
Driven by what he saw as a lack of an overall synthesis in the field, he discusses balance 
of power as a theory in thought and practice in the Europe state system, with the 
Congress as a singular case study. He argues that European statesmen perceived of a 
special European system that self-corrected for the rise of hegemonic forces. His 
treatment of Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna focuses on the idea of a reactionary 
treaty, one that would serve to entrap later French aggression. This diplomatic trap would 
serve to redress the potential homogony nearly achieved by Napoleonic France and set up 
the framework to resist renewed campaigns by either France or Russia in Central 
Europe.33  
Gulick does make some excellent points about the nature of international 
guarantee, but he ignores the reality of European statecraft. While there had been various 
coalitions in European history against a rising power, the norm in European warfare was 
a short-term military alliance that created a preponderance of power for the exploitation 
of a neighbor. Coalitions were usually predatory, not defensive—which may seem to be a 
minor point, but Castlereagh’s efforts at Vienna are only possible with a correct 
understanding of this issue. If the natural inclination towards states is self-correcting, 
Castlereagh was merely a political actor giving shape to an intrinsic diplomatic 
                                                          
33
 Ibid., 134-135. 
22 
 
 
 
undercurrent—but if the norm of European diplomacy was conflict and exploitation, then 
his actions in forming the Treaty of Chaumont to guard against France, his attempts to 
pro-actively invest power in other states, and his attempts to forge a lasting peace are all 
the more impressive. Guilick touches on some interesting ideas, but fails to grasp the 
nature of the diplomatic system that Castlereagh and his peers worked in.34  
If Gulick’s attempt at a minute study led him to error, Paul Schroeder’s The 
Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 succeeded admirably due to the 
inclusiveness of its content and scope. Rather than the issue of balance of power at 
Vienna itself, Schroeder approaches the failures of the old balance of power system 
during the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, and shows the development of equilibrium 
in Europe based on comparable hegemony and underpinned by international law. 35 It was 
not the French, Atlantic, Industrial, and Napoleonic Revolutions that had the greatest 
influence on Europe, but the diplomatic revolution. Ideas and theories of government, not 
the horrors of war, changed European political thought from raw and boundless self-
aggrandizement to a tempered deferral of personal state goals for a larger European 
good.36 Schroeder sets the wars against Napoleon in the proper context of predatory state 
interests, but draws special attention to the Third Coalition. For Schroeder, the Coalition 
kept together by Castlereagh was the turning point for Austria and Prussia. Their defeats, 
reversals, and betrayals had taught them that the formation and success of an international 
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alliance was difficult in the current European diplomatic system. It also failed to provide 
security. Both Powers, still driven by self interest, began to recognize the need for a new 
system or tenor for diplomatic relations in Europe.  
The primary difference between the policies of the 18th and 19th centuries is that 
the latter relied on the deferral of unbridled ambition and a basis of diplomacy on law, 
legitimacy, and trust over temporary exploitation. While other authors might say that the 
new generation of statesmen after the death of Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand 
did not fear the destruction brought about by the Napoleonic Wars as their predecessors 
did, Schroeder asserts that the principle error was a failure in maintaining the new 
political system.37 Schroeder’s work has little time to discuss the personal politics of 
Castlereagh at the Congress, but he does touch on a fundamental truth of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: their destruction and upheaval was so disastrous as 
to prompt a desire in Castlereagh to set aside unbridled British wealth, power, and 
influence on the Continent to pursue that end. In the discussion of the events at Vienna, 
the transformation in European politics was well underway. It would take Castlereagh’s 
settlement and plan to guard against France to make it a reality. 
Popular History of Castlereagh and Congress 
The end of the Cold War and the movement of academia to other aspects of social 
history brought out a renewed interest in the classic biography, as well as in the period 
piece meant for a larger audience. While the former reconciled the individual with his 
academic, economic, religious, and ideological surroundings, the latter ignited an interest 
towards a larger audience. The introduction of Castlereagh and the Congress of Vienna 
into popular nonfiction is surprising at first glance, but the upheaval and turmoil of the 
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period and the personal nature of the conflict and negotiations lend themselves well to a 
stirring narrative. This new perspective is the fruit of a renewed interest in social history, 
as well as an attempt to make diplomacy approachable to the general public. The works 
of David King, Adam Zamoyski, and John Bew are three recent entries in the popular 
history of the Congress and Castlereagh.38 
As an example, David King’s Vienna: 1814 focuses on the revels, dances, and 
dalliances of the princes and statesmen at Vienna.39 King’s approach of laying out the 
figures of the Congress as compelling characters with their own personal idiosyncrasies, 
flaws, and strengths allows him to focus on some of the lesser individuals who took part, 
such as Dorothee de Talleyrand Perigord.40  His focus on the pageantry, torrid affairs, and 
social distraction of the Congress creates the image that events at the Congress were 
petty. He describes borders and souls parceled out at the swish of a pen, but does not 
establish the real fear among the different Powers and their willingness to go to war. The 
conflict over territory and prestige was a game, but their function in maintaining peace 
and seeking state self interest. King’s desire to focus on the material and social culture is 
commendable, but he has failed the reader if the Congress is seen as silly as opposed to 
how deadly earnest it was. King points out Castlereagh’s goal to build an “iron ring” 
around France while undermining its importance or seriousness of that goal by focusing 
on aristocratic minutia.41 In his coverage of the Holy Alliance, King says that Castlereagh 
was comfortable with the new “general European police.” King also says that the 
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revolutions in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Naples made the “Great Powers” declare that 
they would not recognize revolutionary movements or settlements and would resist them 
by force. Both of these statements are misleading because Britain, France, and Austria all 
had differing opinions on recognition of revolutionary forces. King creates the false 
image of unanimous, concerted reaction in Europe where none existed. In the rush for 
greater public interest and coverage of social history, it is important not to slip into error.  
The historiography of the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh are a rich field that 
has transformed between the scholarship during Great War and current historic and 
literary trends. The telescoped political analysis of the interwar period gave way to 
studies that attempted to uncover trends or transformative processes in politics. World 
War II and the Cold War prompted a further desire in some political historians to provide 
a response to the Marxist narrative of European politics based on the broader issues of the 
early modern period. In spite of this new focus, historians kept returning to the Congress 
of Vienna due to its place as a nexus of modern European history. The rise of greater 
interest in social history and a widening audience for public history has brought an 
innovative change. The background of political figures, the details of their lives while 
conducting diplomacy, and the social context in which they worked are synthesized with 
earlier writers who focused on high politics and sweeping diplomatic transformation.  
Castlereagh and Nationalism at the Congress 
While there have been several books that dealt with nationalist movements around 
the time of the Congress of Vienna, some authors still tend to focus on the image of the 
Great Powers running rough-shod over national interest. It is true that Webster took this 
route, but Hannah Strauss expertly deals with the nationalist ideas circulating Vienna 
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during the Congress in The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in 
Germany, Italy, and Poland.  Works that continue to make an appeal to abjured 
nationalism at the Congress come across as rather niche in focus. A recent example of 
this trend was Adam Zamoyski’s The Rites of Peace. While it principally dealt with the 
military defeat of Napoleon and the arranging of the coalition against him, Zamoyski 
points out that the plans of the Allies while fighting Napoleon in the field were temporary 
measures, plans to reflect the discourse in London or Vienna. Instead of reassessing the 
necessity of their decisions, the Allies carried on with their established plans and policies. 
Zamoyski’s discussion of the redrawing of borders is an interesting discussion that leaves 
some confusion on where he stands on the pragmatism or justice of the settlement. While 
he does assert that the Congress’ overall settlement supported the goals of the ancien 
regime, he does not condemn them for pursing their own ends. Throughout his work, 
Zamoyski is rather critical of most of the proceedings regarding Poland. Harold Nicolson 
and David King also have passing remarks about the cavalier attitude of the Congress 
towards the lesser states of Europe.  
With some issues in the historiography of a subject, it is possible to make a brief 
note and move on. The issue of nationalism and ideology at the Congress of Vienna are 
integral to the understanding of the Congress and Castlereagh’s goals. Castlereagh and 
the rest of the Congress did not ignore the possibility of nationalism, nor did they as a 
body desire to impede it in all its forms. Castlereagh weighed the benefits of nationalism 
against its intemperance and fragility, siding with order and some form of control by the 
ancien regime on the Continent. This is not a tangential issue for the scholarship of 
Castlereagh. It ties into how he viewed the settlement of Europe. If he abjured 
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nationalism for reasons other than a natural inclination towards aristocracy, then it is 
more likely that strategic concerns pushed him onward. The statesmen at Vienna did not 
dismiss nationalism out of hand, but rather they addressed its benefits and dangers for 
their own personal goals and the general peace of Europe. Castlereagh in particular 
showed ideological flexibility in how he dealt with these issues. While he might make 
use of nationalist sentiment, his underlying goal was always the preservation of peace in 
Europe. 
  The issue of German nationalism at the end of the Napoleonic Wars split 
through the sharp difference in opinion between the two largest German states, Prussia 
and Austria. While figures in Prussia hoped to use German nationalism to further their 
own ends, Austria saw the movement as a possible danger. German nationalism might 
strengthen the solidarity of the German states, but it would also erode the cohesiveness of 
the multi-ethic Hapsburg holdings. Castlereagh had freedom at Vienna, but his actions 
towards German nationalism—and its effects on the government’s budget—had to appear 
before Parliament. While the Tories willingly incorporated Saxony into Prussia and the 
Whigs preferred to preserve it, neither group had a clear idea of the larger issues of the 
settlement. No matter the response of Parliament, Castlereagh saw his own goals for 
balance of power as solid and able to stand against the opposition.42 In spite of his 
eventual acquiescence of Saxon territory, Castlereagh did remark that “if the 
incorporation of the whole of Saxony into the Prussian monarchy is necessary to assure 
the welfare of Europe, I would not condemn the measure from either the political or 
moral point of view, though I feel some regret at the idea of seeing such an ancient family 
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so profoundly injured.”43 His response to the settlement of Saxony and German 
nationalism became less friendly as tensions increased between the Great Powers over the 
settlement of Poland and Saxony. On his return to England, he expressed his new distrust 
of German nationalism by stating that “public feeling, not merely the people of Germany, 
but of all other countries, would have been wounded by so great and complete a sacrifice 
of an ancient family.”44 For Castlereagh, Germany nationalism only became an issue after 
it threatened to bolster Prussia and threaten the balance of power in Central Europe. 
Regardless of larger diplomatic and strategic concerns, any talk of unifying the states of 
Germany touched on the interest of Britain due to the holdings of House Hanover. For 
Castlereagh, the issue of Hanover was “a point of honor, and a point of honor to this 
country.”45 The Prince Regent shared this opinion, showing indifference to the loss of 
territories to Hanover. 
 Britain’s interest in German nationalism was a non-issue in spite of the royal 
connection to Hanover, but Austrian and Prussian interests bound up with the idea of a 
German nation. Two of Castlereagh’s goals at the Congress of Vienna were the 
strengthening of Prussia in northern Europe in order to serve as a physical buffer against 
France in the German states, as well as the strengthening of Austria to block French 
military incursions into Italy and diplomatic forays into the German states. The 
historiography of the liberation of Germany and contest between Austria and Prussia for 
the hearts and minds of the German Confederation is too large to discuss here.46 While 
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both of these states had their own interests and goals, Castlereagh had a great deal of 
diplomatic wiggle room at the Congress. There are those who lay the control of the 
Congress System at the feet of Metternich—and rightly so—but the Congress System 
was only possible because Castlereagh saw its value at Chaumont and pursued it with 
vigor. 
Castlereagh’s response to nationalism in Italy suffered complications by Joachim 
Murat sitting on the throne of Naples and Britain’s earlier use of nationalism as a sword 
against Napoleon. While Napoleon had covered himself in glory in his early campaigns 
in northern Italy, the death knells of his empire prompted the rise of a muted nationalist 
sentiment. His brother-in-law Murat was a man of great ambition, who considered uniting 
Italy under his rule. Eugene Beauharnais, the viceroy of Italy, considered doing the same. 
While the passions of these men could be seen as traditional dynastic desires under the 
guise of a populist movement, the actions of British and Austrian commanders on the 
ground introduced further difficulties. Austrian commanders Marshall Bellegarde and 
General Nugent promised freedom from foreign oppression and called for national 
independence. More embarrassing for Castlereagh at the later Congress were the pro-
Italian declarations of Lord William Bentinck, the commander of Britain’s forces in Italy. 
Bentinck was inconsistent in his support, also promising Genoa freedom as a separate 
republic. 47 While this sentiment was useful while the Allies were in contest against 
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Napoleon, it quickly became a liability and an obstacle after conflict ceased. To 
Castlereagh, the support of Italian nationalism had been “excusable” because “we were 
justified in running all risks,” but he quickly asserted that a continuation of this policy 
was unadvisable.48  As with the issue of the settlement in Saxony, Parliament held strong 
opinions—and little information—on the settlement in Italy. The Whigs supported the 
nationalist movement in Italy and criticized Austrian power in that region.49 While the 
Whigs spoke irreconcilably of freedom for Genoa and nationalism in Italy, the Tories 
supported the strengthening of Sardinia. Though nationalism was useful, Castlereagh 
focused instead on the needs for balance of power in Europe and sacrificed the desires of 
the people of Italy for Austrian compensation and a stronger Piedmont-Sardinia. 
The issue of nationalism in Poland is muddled by its history of division and the 
fears of the other Great Powers over Russian influence in Central Europe. The Whigs 
supported a separate Polish state, a bold and ambitious goal given its partitions.50 
Castlereagh saw the appeals of Tsar Alexander as a shameless power grab covered by fair 
sentiment.51 His eventual support of a Polish state was an attempt to make a buffer 
limiting the ambitions of Russia in Central Europe. While the issue of nationalism did not 
take hold and dictate the policies of the Great Powers at Vienna, the movement did play a 
factor in the propaganda at the Congress. Castlereagh supported and abjured the 
sentiment of nationalism in his turn, not due to wavering ideology, but due to a realist 
desire to maintain peace in Europe. 
The Ideology of Castlereagh 
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 As with nationalism, the other flaw laid against Castlereagh is a charge of over-
conservatism and ideological rigidity. While some of Castlereagh’s contemporaries and 
successors asserted that he reinforced European conservatism and tied Britain to despotic 
Powers, this view either relies on the mischaracterization of his goals or on a 
misunderstanding of European ideological trends. Percy Shelley compared Castlereagh to 
the gruesome figure of death in The Masque of Anarchy and George Byron called 
Castlereagh an “intellectual eunuch” who combined despotism with foolishness.52 The 
criticisms against Castlereagh do draw attention to his failure in publishing his political 
thoughts or of passing them on to a successor, but it does not necessarily imply that he 
did not approach his international politics with a great deal of forethought and 
experience. In the most sweeping terms, European conservatism rests on the necessity or 
sanctity of the rights of the monarchy and the ancien regime. While some states looked to 
utilitarian benefits of a central authority under the monarch and nobility, others focused 
more on the supposed providential nature of the aristocracy—their legitimacy as ordained 
by God. European liberalism was a mixture of greater control by the aristocracy over the 
monarchy (a push back against absolutism) with greater receptiveness to popular opinion. 
It was rare for any European state to seek out local involvement in decision making. Even 
the extreme Committee of Public Safety and the political parties of the French Revolution 
feared the disorder of over-participation by the wrong sort in statecraft.53 There is a 
logical fallacy in the work of some popular historians that equate Castlereagh’s goals at 
the Congress with either liberal or conservative goals. Castlereagh did have forays into 
liberal ideology, and later allied with Tories in Parliament, but his goals in foreign policy 
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were pragmatic in nature. There is little evidence to suggest that Castlereagh’s 
international policy was directed by what he thought would support conservative or 
liberal ideology. He did not go to war to make Europe safe for constitutional monarchies 
nor did he expect himself to redirect the currents of internal politics in Europe. 
 Most authors, no matter their attention to detail, gloss over Castlereagh’s 
background and ideology. The most recent entry in the scholarship, John Bew’s 
Castlereagh, circumvents this trap and instead discusses Robert Stewart as a man of his 
time with a full discussion of his familial, ideological, and governmental background. 
Bew fully covers Castlereagh's life in Ireland and his early actions against Napoleon with 
Pitt to demonstrate his social, ethnic, and ideological context. Rather than focus on the 
international upheaval of the period or the political exchanges between the Great Powers, 
Bew’s focus allows the reader to ignore the arguments of absolute political ideologies 
and long-term military concerns. Instead, he brings the chaos and ad hoc nature of the 
Napoleonic conflict and diplomacy to life.  
 Bew spends an inordinate amount of time in his book covering Castlereagh’s 
actions and goals during his time of political power in Ireland.54 Rather than a colorful 
beginning, this material on Castlereagh in Ireland serves to counter those who assert that 
Castlereagh was a pure reactionary. At Vienna, his desire for a swift settlement—to the 
exclusion of the lesser powers—was not a conservative power-grab to bolster the ailing 
ranks of the ancien regime. Castlereagh objected to the threat of military dominance in 
Europe; as such, he had to tread the delicate balance between limiting the possible 
resurgence of French power and the current control of so much territory by Russia.55 
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Where his book shines is how it puts all of the actions of Castlereagh in context. 
Castlereagh’s education, family stresses, ideological pragmatism, struggles with 
Parliament, and battles over the Act of Union and the future of Ireland all play a part in 
his policy. Bew’s exhaustive research into the life of Castlereagh avoids the hasty labels 
of Conservative or Reactionary.  While the letters and official government documents 
from the Congress would give an indication as to what Castlereagh planned for settled 
Europe, the inclusion of an ideological background gives the historian a fuller 
understanding of his plans and purposes. Even though men can break free of their social 
conditioning, Castlereagh’s background undoubtedly affected the realism of his 
diplomatic approach and his plan for the neutralization of future French aggression.   
Castlereagh’s Congressional Legacy 
The historiography of the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh are rich fields that 
span more than a century. However, there do seem to be some fundamental issues that 
limit the effectiveness of some of the works. Most historians have no clear definition of 
what they mean when discussing institutions and events, fail to fully address the effects 
of the issues in a larger European and world context, and entertain unreasonable 
expectations of Castlereagh and his peers. 
While Webster and Schroeder are careful with their use of terms in this 
historiography, others are less exact. There is a whiggish propensity to treat the various 
coalitions formed by Pitt and Castlereagh against the Revolution and Napoleon as false 
starts for the inevitable Sixth Coalition. Whether willing or otherwise, authors present the 
coalitions as failed attempts to build the Europe of 1815 rather than separate political 
unions that were based around the goals of politicians, economic concerns, and the 
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success or failures of armies in the field. There is a similar propensity for authors to treat 
the Sixth Coalition and the Quadruple Alliance as if they were the same thing. The 
former was a large collection of greater and lesser European states arrayed against 
Napoleonic France, while the latter was a concerted plan by Britain, Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia designed to oppose Napoleon, secure peace, and to endure after the end of 
hostiles. To treat these two alliances as one is to give unwarranted legitimacy to the 
Quadruple Alliance’s decisions at the Congress of Vienna and subsequent Congresses. 
The Congresses themselves are problematic in the historiography, as there is a propensity 
to discuss the Congress System and Concert of Europe interchangeably. The former 
ended in the 1820s, while the latter was an idea appealed to in Europe up until the Great 
War.56  
Webster, Temperley, Schroeder, and Kissinger all take time to pull back from the 
specifics of their research and assert the overall importance of what they are discussing. 
Many of their latter-day peers, however, avoid addressing the larger questions raised by 
the Congress and the peace in Europe. Zamoyski focuses on the fate of Poland, King is 
interested with the pageantry and personal factors, and John Bew’s work is remarkably 
thorough but limited to Castlereagh. These types of social and personal studies are useful 
to the field and attract new historians, but this meticulousness could be channeled in other 
ways.  Zamoyski, King, and Bew could take their detailed, yet riveting manner of 
research and direct it to what figures thought of the Congress System, balance of power, 
and the intersection of foreign diplomacy with local politics. The trend of displaying 
Castlereagh and Canning as opposing figures lingers. While the heirs of Pitt did disagree 
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on how to preserve Britain, their underlying goals were similar. Both sought the defeat of 
Napoleon, limit the power and reach of the Holy Alliance, free Latin America from 
European influence, and obtain reapproachment with the United States. These issues 
strained the relationship between the two men, but it is unreasonable to cast them as 
opposing forces. For all of their differences, they moved within the same social circles, 
had similar upbringings, and the same entertained general political philosophy. 
Most of the texts written on the Congress of Vienna in the last few decades have 
been kinder to Castlereagh than his contemporaries. No longer seen as a villain who sold 
out the liberals of Europe to dally with monarchs, he was a statesman who tempered his 
ideals with realism and a firm belief in utilitarianism in international power politics. 
Castlereagh’s goals at Vienna to encircle France and neutralize its aggression as well as 
win a lasting peace were not some ephemeral plan born to protect his peers’ social 
privilege or to solely advance Britain’s interests. Castlereagh pursued both Britain’s 
national interest and Europe’s ultimate good by the pursuit of peace—a lasting peace that 
was made possible by his ideological background, strategic and diplomatic experiences, 
tireless effort, and willingness to make difficult and sometimes repellent choices at the 
settlement in Vienna. 
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Chapter Two 
Castlereagh before the Congress 
While men’s goals and desires are not the sole result of their upbringing—their 
early education, political leanings, and public actions undoubtedly matter. Regardless of 
the future arrayed for Castlereagh, his background affected his later political and 
diplomatic policies. Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, was born the 18th of June, 
1769, to a respected and ambitious Scots-Irish family.57 He was the second son of Robert 
Stewart and Lady Sarah Stewart, whose first child had died that same year as 
Castlereagh’s birth. His mother, the Lady Sarah, followed her first child Alexander into 
the grave in July 1770. Castlereagh’s father, Lord Londonderry, threw himself into his 
political career in Dublin, and his son received a warm upbringing at their home, Mount 
Stewart. As a child, Castlereagh was clever, quick, and healthy.58 His youthful 
exuberance was full of an active social life among his Irish peers, but he did have some 
missteps in dealing with the fairer sex. At one point, Castlereagh dueled with a member 
of the local gentry to defend his conduct with a young woman under the gentryman’s 
charge. More salacious was the claim that he had pursued, won, and gotten a child on a 
young serving maid named Nelly Stoal. The truth is unknown, but the Stewarts did give 
her a cottage and financial support of 100 pounds a year—and Castlereagh would call on 
her whenever he was nearby. In spite of these issues, at the age of 16, Castlereagh stayed 
in London for his first introduction to public society. By 1785, he took part in political 
life and attended meetings at the House of Commons. 
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The fortunes of the Stewarts improved during Castlereagh’s childhood after his 
father entered into an advantageous second marriage in 1775. He achieved the position of 
Privy Councilor in Ireland in 1795 and became Earl of Londonderry in 1789. It was after 
his father’s ascension to Earl of Londonderry that Robert achieved the courtesy title of 
Viscount Castlereagh. These changes increased the family’s involvement in the Irish 
peerage and exposed Castlereagh to the writings of the English Enlightenment and Ulster 
Irish Whigs and patriots. This familiarity played an important role in his later push for the 
Act of Union.59 The early years of Castlereagh’s life took place in a background of 
political upheaval. Under various English monarchs, Ireland suffered a systematic loss of 
land to English peers and the division of large family holdings due to inheritance laws 
designed to divide Irish holdings into ever-smaller plots. The dominance of the 
Parliament in Ireland was due in part to the policy excluding Catholics from holding 
office. While Castlereagh had a pleasant childhood, the confluence of economic, social, 
political, and religious conflict between English, Irish, Anglican Irish, and Catholic Irish 
influenced his early political trials.60 
Castlereagh’s political life began in earnest after his return from Cambridge. This 
return coincided with a push by his father to reassert the family’s interests against an Irish 
political rival, Lord Downshire, in the Irish Parliament, and his ascendancy to peerage as 
the Lord of Londonderry in 1789. In spite of his vigorous support of his father and his 
own campaigning, Castlereagh was ambivalent about a life in politics in Ireland with its 
“petty provincial politics” and the rudeness of its court compared to “English knowledge, 
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and more enlightened knowledge.”61 His ascendancy to the House coincided with that of 
Arthur Wellesley, a man whose fortune intertwined with Castlereagh’s.62 He sat in 
Parliament for ten years, during which time Ireland enjoyed comparably greater freedom 
than it had from the direct influence of England. This freedom was in part due to the 
harsh criticism of Henry Grattan, a political firebrand, whose call for a separate 
Parliamentary rule for Ireland continually undermined the goals of the English 
Parliament.63 Castlereagh succeeded in finding a balance between those in the Irish 
Parliament who called for greater freedom, and his own connections and interests in the 
English Parliament. In particular, he maintained a relationship with William Pitt’s 
administration.64  
In his time in Parliament, Castlereagh defied easy polarization by contemporaries 
and historians alike. His background in Irish liberalism, contacts with the realism of Pitt, 
and own musings on the role of government stumped those who would ascribe him a 
simple political label. He disapproved of the spread of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man 
because it “alter’d the people of Ireland”, supported Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France in spite of some inconsistencies between Burke’s sentiments and 
those of Irish Whigs, and initially celebrated the fall of the Bastille.65 In a trip to Spa in 
the Netherlands, Castlereagh saw the Revolution firsthand. In a letter to his grandfather, 
Castlereagh laid out what he saw as the three principle goals of a government: protect 
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personal liberty, protect personal property, and keep taxes within reasonable levels. He 
found the French government wanting the first two areas. Apart from his time at Spa, 
Castlereagh also traveled to Paris. After observing the National Assembly in session, he 
said that the Revolution had “done much to approve and much to condemn,” and that “an 
essential change was necessary for the happiness and dignity of a great people, long in a 
state of degradation.” 66  
However, Castlereagh’s subsequent discomfort with Revolutionary France 
affected his relationship with those in Ireland who supported an independence movement 
to separate them from Britain. In his first speech delivered in February 1791, he insisted 
that the admission of Ireland into trade with the Far East or India should be based on “not 
a spirit of local partiality, but as a member of the British Empire.” While Castlereagh’s 
commitment to the idea of a separate Ireland endured until the later revolt, he was already 
weighing the benefits of working within the British Empire against the possible dangers 
of trying to leave it. While Castlereagh desired greater freedom for Ireland, his time on 
the Continent had soured him to those who postulated a similar revolution in Ireland or 
an international alliance with France.67 His discomfiture was not over the revolution of 
the French people against the ancien regime, for which he had criticism, but over its 
disrupting effects on society and mistreatment of the individual. 
 Castlereagh’s break with his independence-minded, Irish colleagues began with 
the arrest of a Charles Hamilton Teelings, a former acquaintance of the family who had 
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been in contact with the French government about the possibility of a French invasion.68 
Castlereagh’s arrest of Teelings was only one of many as the threat of collaborators with 
the feared French invasion gave way to increased government reaction. Castlereagh 
shared a public role in these arrests, and as time went on, the popularity of Castlereagh 
and his family in Ireland sank to an all-time low as peers who had hoped for greater 
autonomy looked on the family with fear and distrust. He took up a residence in Dublin 
Castle, the seat of British power in Ireland, and sought to maintain peace and limit those 
who might have helped France. Contrary to the popular belief of his contemporaries, 
Castlereagh was not able to wield sinister powers from within Dublin Castle, spurring 
betrayal and treachery among the independence-minded. In fact, he was unprepared for 
the confluence of external and internal threats. As Castlereagh heard that ships from 
Toulon were moving to lead and invasion into Ireland, the country stirred in discontent 
that would end in revolt in 1789. In response to the French invasion, Castlereagh led a 
group of militia—though awkwardly arranged—around the coast of Ireland, traipsing 
around the countryside without certainty of where the French might land.69  
While this invasion came to naught, the confluence of Castlereagh’s support of 
British interests over Irish and the “repelling” of French forces set the tone for three 
defining characteristics of his career: his harsh legacy at home, hid struggle for the Act of 
Union, and a steadfast fight against the military dangers of the French Revolution.70 The 
arrests of so many revolutionaries, his seat of power at the traditionally reviled Dublin 
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Castle, and his military maneuvers against the French invasion earned Castlereagh the 
hatred of many peers in Ireland. Castlereagh’s earnest affection for Ireland and his fears 
over Ireland’s fate if it separated from Britain tempered his actions. He did not sell out 
his peers in Ireland who supported a separate Parliament for the praise of his allies in 
London, instead he chose the economic connections and tranquility that Britain could 
provide in the long term over what he had seen of French anarchy in Spa and Paris.71 
Aside from the economic benefit to Ireland, Castlereagh feared what ruin a war between 
Britain and France fought in Ireland would do to his native land. If Castlereagh had a 
private political philosophy, it was more in tune with classical liberalism as opposed to 
Tory-monarchism.72 His goal was peace and he had a profound respect for the mixed 
system of government in Britain that checked mob rule and tyranny while also supporting 
means for more direct governmental control and the trappings of popular participation. 
Regardless of his ideals, Castlereagh’s pragmatism towards the conflict with 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France overcame what more ephemeral desires he may 
have had for policy.  
 While Castlereagh’s efforts kept returning him to the familial and governmental 
duties in Ireland, his heart and interests pulled him back to London. Castlereagh had 
grown up in Ireland and achieved political success there, but his preferences lay in 
London politics, especially with William Pitt. Encouraged by his grandfather Lord 
Camden, Castlereagh attended several of Pitts debates at Westminster during his time at 
Cambridge between 1787 and 1788.73 Castlereagh did not always approve of the Pittites 
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in Ireland itself. In particular, he held the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, the Earl 
Westmorland, in scant regard.74 Convinced of his role as an impediment to reform, 
Castlereagh was clear that he “shall not lament his [Westmorland’s] departure.”75 
Castlereagh received a good deal of advice from Lord Camden and William Pitt to help 
him navigate between the conflicting loyalties to his peers around the country and the 
control of Britain in the Castle at Dublin, but he still suffered from a strained relationship 
with many of his peers.76 After having worked together, Pitt pressed Castlereagh into the 
position of Secretary of State for War as part of a plan to hurriedly make up two allies 
that Pitt had just lost in Parliament. This new office served Castlereagh in the short term, 
making up for his electoral defeat in the County Down, but in the long term, it also 
served a greater purpose. His position kept him in contact with Pitt during the peace 
memorandum that Pitt drew up with Russia in 1805.77 Pitt’s plan later served as a map to 
Castlereagh for the settlement of Europe. When Castlereagh came to the Foreign Office, 
he continued this close working relationship and assisted in the drafted peace settlement 
of 1805.78  
 Castlereagh’s policies were born of his own experiences and political philosophy, 
but Pitt’s policies on strategic reaction to French aggression and future settlement of 
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Europe affected Castlereagh’s later goals at the Congress. Pitt’s international policy 
focused on some form of coalition against unrestrained France that involved a system of 
guarantees and legitimacy within international law. Two prime examples of Pitt’s policies 
include a letter he assisted in writing to M.F. Chauvelin in December 1792 and a 
memorandum he wrote to Tsar Alexander in January 1805.79 The letter to Chauvelin 
spoke about concern over the call of the Convention in France to “encourage disorder and 
revolt in all countries, even in those which are neutral.”80 While the extreme discomfiture 
of the British government of a foreign power advocating their overthrow was bad enough, 
more contentious was the irreconcilability of proposed French policy and its military 
actions. While French leaders abjured the annexation of territory in November 1792, they 
launched an attack upon the capital of Antwerp, Scheldt. The British government found 
the continued promise of the Revolutionary government to respect, “the independence 
and rights of England and her allies” coupled with a demonstrated intent to “maintain 
these open and injurious aggressions” against the holdings of those same states untenable.  
This confusing foreign policy indicated a larger fault with the French government, 
the false conception that they had the right to set aside the treaties and rights between the 
nations of Europe.81 France’s abjuring Britain’s role in the Low Countries while calling 
their own seizure a form of justice was galling. While Pitt might have been 
uncomfortable with the radical nature of the Revolution towards monarchy, the chief 
criticism of the statesmen was never on Revolutionary ideology, it was its execution of its 
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ideology in a diplomatic framework. Instead of condemning Chauvelin in the lessening of 
his monarch, Pitt’s criticisms were over the fomentation of rebellion and French 
expansion into the Low Countries. There was a distinction between intervention “for the 
purpose of establishing any form of Gov[ernment] in France,” and “a concert between 
other Gov[ernment]s to provide for their own security at a time when political interests 
are endangered both by the intrigues of France in the interior of other countries, and by 
their views of conquest and aggrandizement.”82 Pitt’s focus on the strategic realities was 
important for Britain’s foreign policy, but it also had a great influence on Castlereagh’s 
eventual views. 
 In January 1805, Pitt wrote a memorandum to Tsar Alexander after lengthy 
discussions with Ambassador Prince Adam Czartoryski.83 The memorandum laid out 
three objects that a concert between their countries might achieve. They could free the 
sections of Europe that had fallen under French power since the Revolution, build a 
barrier against future French aggression, and establish a peace based on conventions and 
guarantees for mutual protection and security. Pitt sought a system that guaranteed the 
rights of all states, not that undermined local sovereignty.84 The chief military concerns 
of the memorandum were the “Evacuation of the North Germany and Italy, the Re-
establishment of the Independence of the United Provinces, and of Switzerland, the 
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Restoration of the Dominions of the King of Sardinia, and the security of Naples.”85 
Coupled with these goals, a more encompassing plan limited future French aggression 
and secured a longer peace in Europe. Castlereagh would imitate much of these policies, 
especially the settlement of the United Provinces and northern Italy. 
Pitt then divided the dominated states of Europe into two groups—those who 
could stand on their own against France after restoration, and those countries whose 
occupation had destroyed local autonomy and lacked the inherent strength to resist 
France. While Pitt eagerly advocated for the independence of the former (the United 
Provinces, Switzerland, extended Sardinia, Tuscany, and Modena), he saw the weakness 
of the latter (Genoa, the Austrian Netherlands, and much of traditional Austrian Italy that 
fell under France) as a danger to Europe. Pitt discussed the parceling out of much of Italy, 
but his primary concern was the enlargement of Sardinia, the United Provinces, and of 
Prussia. Bolstered Sardinia would serve as a bulwark in Italy, the enlarged United 
Provinces would be a less tempting target for France, and strengthened Prussia would 
protect the Rhine and the Low Countries. Pitt did temper his generous offer of territory to 
Prussia with a provision that it would be limited to secure the support of Austria and 
Russia. While Pitt had an eye towards larger European concerns, he continued to work 
within the existing diplomatic and strategic system.  
Some authors would set up a conflict between Castlereagh and Canning for the 
title of Pitt’s political heir, but Castlereagh clearly inherited—and helped form—Pitt’s 
plans for peace in Europe. In the midst of 1813, while Castlereagh was building the last 
coalition to fight Napoleonic France, Castlereagh wrote, “The main features we are 
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agreed upon—to keep France in order, we require great masses—that Prussia, Austria, 
and Russia ought to be as great and powerful as they have ever been—and that the 
inferior States must be summoned to assist, or pay the forfeit of resistance.” To 
demonstrate what his plan for peace would look like, Castlereagh alluded to the 
memorandum written by Pitt to Tsar Alexander in 1805, writing,  
As an outline to reason from, I send you, as a private communication, a 
despatch on which the confederacy in 1805 was founded; the Emperor of 
Russia probably has not this interesting document at headquarters: 
(interesting it is to my recollection, as I remember having more than one 
conversation with Mr. Pitt on the details, before he wrote it) some of the 
suggestions may now be inapplicable, but it is so masterly an outline for 
the restoration of Europe.86 
 
Years later, in the midst of the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh again alluded to Pitt’s 
memorandum in a letter to the Duke of Wellington, stating, “I am always led to revert to 
with considerable favor to a policy which Mr. Pitt, in the year 1806 [sic], had strongly at 
the heart, which was to tempt Prussia to put herself forward on the left back of the Rhine, 
more in military contact with France.”87 The memorandum of Pitt was a plan for 
restructuring Europe to maintain peace, not for solely furthering Britain’s self interest or 
Pitt’s personal ideology—and Castlereagh worked with him on putting it together. 
Castlereagh was a staunch admirer of Pitt from his earliest introductions to Parliamentary 
debates. While Castlereagh’s background tempered his life and political fortunes in 
Ireland, Pitt’s political realism greatly influenced Castlereagh’s later opinions on 
checking Napoleonic ambitions and the necessity of limiting France. The threat of France 
as a direct military force and indirect supporter of economic or social disruption trumped 
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personal opinions on French revolutionary ideology. French bayonets and cannons were a 
more pressing fear than any number of maypoles and tricolor ribbons.  
 Castlereagh’s interaction with Pitt was not limited to absorbing his tutor’s 
thoughts on combating France. The two worked together closely in trying to bind Ireland 
and Britain. The first issue they had to address was the anger in Ireland over 
representation and sovereignty. The dissatisfaction of Ireland on the eve of the rebellion 
took no one by surprise. Pitt had long been aware of discontentment in Ireland over the 
limited political participation of most Catholics due to the Ascendancy, and the political 
and economic domination of Ireland by a minority of Protestant landowners and clergy. 
While the Ascendancy spanned over a century, the recent upheaval in Ireland made it 
look weak and ineffectual to Protestants in Ireland and British statesmen who hoped to 
maintain authority. The waning social domination also looked assailable to those in 
Ireland who wanted to some form of home rule. Taking advantage of the waning 
confidence of the Ascendancy, Pitt moved forward with the Union.88 Castlereagh, on the 
other hand, had extended firsthand experience with the ever-worsening political malaise. 
He knew that the Ascendancy could not stand forever and pondered several solutions, the 
Union among them.89 The Union would solve Castlereagh’s fears of French domination 
as well as his discomfiture with the treatment of the Irish. The British Parliament had 
feared domination of Irish Parliament by Catholics over Protestants if there was a union 
between the two kingdoms, but if Catholics gained franchise and government office 
within a single, unified British kingdom, then they would be a minority and no danger. Of 
course, Castlereagh hoped for the Union and the recognition of Irish Catholics.  
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 In spite of this hope, the Emancipation could not move forward due to a lack of 
support in London and the disapproval of local Protestant elites in Ireland. The Union 
itself was quickly pushed forward with Castlereagh’s insistence that delay would only 
cause greater unrest.90 In spite of unrest around Dublin, the recompense for lost 
Parliamentary seats and the paying off of members of the peerage moved the Act of 
Union forward. While the Union succeeded, the movement of Catholics into political life 
would have to wait until 1829. The introduction of Catholics into Parliament, the 
Catholic Emancipation that Castlereagh and Pitt supported, failed due to King George 
III’s belief that the participation of the Catholics would undermine his coronation oath. 
 Castlereagh and Pitt’s relationship was not some passing political alliance made 
for the sake of convenience. Pitt’s influence directed Castlereagh’s most important 
policies. On one hand, Castlereagh’s personal and ideological connection pulled him 
towards the Irish Whigs; on the other, he rejected the Irish Rebellion due fear of French 
dominance and destruction in case of a war between France and Britain on Irish soil. Pitt 
and Castlereagh worked together to push through the Act of Union, merging Ireland into 
the larger state. Though the plans for Emancipation failed, Pitt’s eased some of 
Castlereagh’s concerns over the fate of Ireland. Castlereagh and Pitt’s shared policies 
towards France and plans for a settlement of Europe became the benchmark of 
Castlereagh’s goals for the defeat of France and the restructuring of the European state 
system. Castlereagh’s steadfast distrust of the strategic goals of Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France were due to his own personal experiences with the disorders of the 
Revolution and close discussions with Pitt. Their shared plan for a settlement of Europe 
                                                          
90Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 1, 442-443. 
49 
 
 
 
and an encirclement of France was a policy that Castlereagh would carry from London to 
Vienna. 
While Castlereagh would be involved in military ventures all over Europe during 
his time in the War and Foreign Offices, his disastrous ordering of the Walcheren 
Expedition is what prompted his duel with Canning. In 1797, in the midst of the French 
occupied Low Countries lay the river Scheldt and the island Walcheren. Housing a royal 
armory, Walcheren served as an ideal setting-out point from which to attack London. 91 
The temporary success of Austria’s fighting in the field and the erroneous information on 
the disposition of the town meant that the attack went ahead.92 The force that Castlereagh 
sent to the Netherlands was larger than that serving in the Peninsular campaign, but the 
attack failed miserably. The troops landed and captured the island of Walcheren, only to 
take ill from the swamp surrounding the island. More than 4,000 of the 20,000 men sent 
died or returned injured from the attack and ill-managed siege. Walcheren, along with 
other failures that fell under Castlereagh’s purview at the War Department, broiled in 
public and Parliamentary discontent. George Canning had been making moves against 
Castlereagh, but dissembled support. While there are accounts (reiterated at the duel) that 
Canning wanted to inform Castlereagh as to the precariousness of his position, but he was 
unable to.93 Regardless, when Canning’s support of Castlereagh ceased with the news of 
the disaster at Walcheren, Castlereagh assumed that his one-time colleague was a 
“perfidious enemy” who had betrayed him. 
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 Setting aside all of the failed coalitions and reversals of combat that the Allied 
Powers went through against France from 1789-1815, one singularly important outcome 
arose from the conflicts: the fear that another force like the French Revolution and the 
Napoleon Wars might wreak terrible destruction on Europe. The Great Powers—
diplomats and sovereigns alike—had gone through such a ruinous cycle of recurring war 
and peace that the leaders of that generation had a firm intent to form a lasting peace. The 
Great Powers were not just continuing their early games of balance and quest for 
aggrandizement; the conflict they had witnessed with its death toll, loss of property, and 
disorder of society on such a drastic scale taught them that while wrangling and 
disagreements may go on, the rules needed to change. 
 After the defeat of Napoleon, all of Europe was in jubilation. The Great Powers 
had at last made peace in Europe, but issues of peace were not at rest. The territorial and 
political confusion was especially acute for the Central European powers of Austria and 
Prussia. Both the armies and diplomats of Austria had worn themselves out with constant 
toil. It had lost its holdings in Italy, mislaid swathes of land in the German States, entered 
financial ruin, and suffered many blows to prestige in its military defeats. With peace 
established, Austria’s monarch Emperor Francis and his preeminent statesman Prince 
Clemens von Metternich hoped that they would secure lands taken from Austria and find 
some succor against the rising power of Russia and Prussia.94 Prussia weathered the 
storm of the Revolution due to geography and fickle political dealings with Napoleon. 
Though Prussia moved close to Russia near the end of the conflict, it suffered a partition 
by Napoleon as penance for its duplicity. King Frederick William III of Prussia and 
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diplomat Prince Karl August von Hardenburg hoped to find some form of compensation 
from the Congress of Vienna. They eyed the Duchy of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Saxony, 
and other sections of Northern Germany that they could bring under their sway.95 
Castlereagh had been in close contact with Metternich in the last days of Napoleon, but 
Metternich’s final separation from Bonaparte came at a time that he thought most 
beneficial to Austrian interests. While Metternich was exceedingly clever in the manner 
and timing of his reapproachment with the Allies, he was not the key figure holding the 
group together. 
 Russia faired comparably well in the Napoleonic Wars, using the lull of combat 
after the first phase in 1793 to round off portions of Poland.96 After the rout of Napoleon 
in 1812, Russian forces pushed on through the German States and liberated them from 
French control. The image, true or feigned, that Tsar Alexander defeated Napoleon and 
rescued Europe vastly increased his prestige and power. Trappings of high purpose and 
mysticism followed Alexander across the fields of Germany and only increased during 
the Peace of Paris. Alexander represented the interests of Russia at the Congress of 
Vienna while pursuing the contradictory roles of liberator in Central Europe and 
expander of Russian influence.97 In the last days of the war against Napoleon, 
Castlereagh’s opinion of Alexander improved, though at the Congress Castlereagh would 
quickly grow to distrust Alexander’s motivations.98 
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Britain accrued benefits and disadvantages from the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars. Under Pitt and Castlereagh, Britain snatched up colonies of France, 
Denmark, the Knights of Malta, and other territories in the midst of the wars. Unlike the 
other Powers, the island fastness of Britain did not come under direct assault due to the 
diligence of the British navy. However, Britain incurred a massive war debt in keeping its 
navy afloat, subsidizing its continental allies, and it continued to fight on a second front 
with the United States in the War of 1812. All of the Great Powers answered to their 
aristocracy and military on some level. Britain had the singular problem of a vocal press 
and an active Parliament. The opinions of the voting populace, small though it may have 
been, affected the choices the British government made and how they approved 
Congressional decisions. This discontent would be especially true of the later treatment 
of Genoa, Saxony, Norway, and Poland. Castlereagh, while battling a disagreeable 
Parliament, endeavored to maintain peace in Europe, secure their trading empire abroad, 
and set up a system that would deal with the rising pretensions of Tsar Alexander.99 One 
of the lynchpins in Castlereagh’s play would be the fate of France. 
 France was defeated, but unconquered. The loss of men, material, and goods from 
France during the Revolution was unprecedented. Equally unprecedented was how many 
lands the other Great Powers let it keep. Holdings that France had won along its natural 
frontiers remained, Britain returned several colonies that it had seized, and France was 
not required to suffer any ignominious blow to prestige.100 The paintings and art that been 
looted from Germany, Italy, and Holland were left in La Louvre because of their beauty 
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when arrayed together. France would indeed occupy the thoughts of many, especially 
Britain, in their fears of a returned hegemony, but this concern did not intrinsically 
engender international discourtesy or mistreatment. Instead, France benefitted by earning 
a surprising amount of respect. The treatment toward France after its defeat is one of the 
best examples of the fundamental change in European politics in the Congress of Vienna 
and the Concert of Europe. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand protected the dignity and 
power of his country at the Congress, attempting to bring Britain into its good graces and 
set up spheres of influence in the German States.101 
 While the Congress at Vienna settled more issues than the just territorial 
settlement of Italy, Germany, Poland, and the Low Countries, these issues were of 
singular importance to Castlereagh. It did not lie in his power to hold back the tides of the 
world and force peace on Europe. The Great Powers were war weary, but if Castlereagh 
was to turn this respite into a lasting peace, he would have to build bastions of power in 
Europe to curb the predatory interests of figures like ambitious Napoleon or messianic 
Alexander. After the Peace of Paris, the threat of French forces in Holland had been 
resolved, but Castlereagh took further steps to remove the danger of future enemies 
seizing the Low Countries with ease. 
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Chapter Three 
The Congress of Vienna 
The Settlement of the Netherlands 
 In retrospect, the settlement of the Netherlands may seem to be the least of 
Castlereagh’s successes. In his negotiations with the House of Orange and the 
consolidation of the Netherlands, he had relatively little disruption from the other Great 
Powers.102 However, the settlement of the Netherlands is of great importance in what it 
shows about Castlereagh’s approach to Britain’s strategic concerns. The Dutch Republic 
held a connection with Britain since the arrival of William of Orange in the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. Edmund Burke in 1791 said that “Holland might justly be considered 
a necessary part of this country as Kent.”103 It was the invasion of this strategic region 
that prompted Pitt’s support of military action against France. The Netherlands, and the 
Low Countries in total, had long been the fighting ground between French, Prussian, 
Hapsburg, and British interests. The Prussian invasion of the Dutch Republic in 
September 1787 and the occupation of the region by French Revolutionary forces in 1795 
highlighted the precariousness of this region and the necessity of bolstering in against 
outside threats. While Britain did pursue a policy to tie the Netherlands to Britain through 
a dynastic union, Castlereagh was interested in how it affected his plans for Britain’s 
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immediate security and for a stronger Northern Germany that could resist French 
aggression.104 
In the midst of the last coalition arrayed against Napoleon, Holland—the 
economic center of northern Europe—was central to Britain’s security. The high level of 
urbanization, sheltered harbors, and the short distance from London made its separation 
from France a necessity for Britain.105 When a revolt supported by Castlereagh broke out 
in Holland on November 15, 1813, Castlereagh sent a diplomat, an improvised military 
force, and 100,000 pounds to support British interests in the region and to help enthrone 
Prince William VI of Orange in the ancient republic. Hoping to strengthen the connection 
between the Netherlands and Britain, a dynastic union between Charlotte the Princess of 
Wales and the Hereditary Prince William II, the son of the new king of the Netherlands, 
seemed politically advantageous. Castlereagh was personally involved in some of these 
interactions, gaining a private audience with the Hereditary Prince in January 1814.106 
This plan failed due to natural frictions between the couple and the possible interference 
of the Russian Grand Duchess Catharine who hoped to win the hand for a Russian Grand 
Duke and thus strengthen Russian interests in the region.107 These difficulties aside, 
Castlereagh was insistent on the strengthening of the Netherlands in spite of possible 
slights to the personal honor of Princess Charlotte. The British government did its utmost 
to maintain positive relations between the two countries, offering the Prince of Orange 
the command of a Hanoverian regiment. Four months, later Castlereagh reasserted that 
the first objective was to “provide effectually against the systemic views of France to 
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possess herself of the Low Countries and the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.”108 
His strengthening of the Netherlands proceeded through three different goals. He secured 
the recognition of protection by the other Great Powers, garnered territory for the new 
state, and pushed for a series of fortresses along the border between the Netherlands and 
France.  
Francis of Austria willingly gave up his holdings in the Low Countries, aware that 
he could not effectively control and govern them in a manner to his liking. With that, 
Castlereagh was able to secure the support of the Great Powers for the freedom of the 
Netherlands.109 With that guarantee, Castlereagh could focus on the internal strength of 
the country. While some in the British government had considered taking lands that were 
ancestrally French and giving them to a larger state in the Netherlands, Castlereagh 
realized that “if you take part of old France and add it to Belgium, all France will, as a 
point of honour, be anxious to regain it.”110 Instead, Castlereagh endeavored to combine 
the Austrian Netherlands with the Dutch Republic to create a larger, more resilient state. 
Peers of Castlereagh suggested the Act of Union that he earlier pushed forward with Pitt 
be the guiding document for reconciling the two territories. The liberal constitution that 
the Prince of Orange signed and the guarantees he enjoyed abroad made the borrowing of 
the Act of Union unnecessary.  
For Castlereagh, another territorial tool for strengthening the Netherlands was the 
restoration of colonies seized during the war. While some of the larger issues were mute 
due to the agreement at the Treaty of Paris that if the Netherlands were strong enough to 
resist attack it would get back many of its seized colonies, the restoration of particular 
                                                          
108
 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 3, March, 1814, in Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, 163. 
109Castlereagh to Clancarty, 14 March, 1814, Castlereagh and Londonderry, vol. 9, 354-356. 
110
 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24, August, 1814, in Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, 370-371. 
57 
 
 
 
colonies remained in question. Britain kept the wealthy Dutch East Indies, but returned 
the West Indian Isles. The settlement of the West Indian islands and Guiana was more 
difficult. British merchants had been heavily investing in the region. Before Castlereagh 
arrived there had been a plan to pay Sweden 1,000,000 pounds for renouncing the island 
of Guadeloupe due to French refusal to part with it in the peace settlement. In 
recompense for the re-establishment of the Netherlands and its union with Belgium, 
Holland would pay the price to Sweden. With Castlereagh’s involvement in this 
settlement, he pushed his policies over the discomfort of some in the Netherlands and 
came to a rather fair settlement. Britain kept the settlements on Guiana and allowed the 
Dutch to trade with them. In compensation, Britain would pay 1,000,000 pounds to 
Sweden, pay off half of the Russian debt in Holland (3,000,000 pounds), and pay 
2,000,000 pounds for the Cape. Looking at the deal closely, Holland was only getting 
2,000,000 new pounds for the settlement. They did not benefit from the other 4,000,000 
taking into account the debt Russia already owed them and the new Swedish debt foisted 
on them. Their windfall of 2,000,000 would not go to their coffers however, but would 
instead go to build fortresses and fortifications between France and the Netherlands.111 
 Castlereagh fought hard for a series of fortresses between the Netherlands and 
France. There was no distress on the part of the other Great Powers, but instead internal 
antagonism in Britain towards the idea that Britain paid for the war against Napoleon and 
that it would have to pay for the peace as well.112 This economic reluctance was the main 
reason why Castlereagh hid the cost of the fortifications in the Netherlands under the 
blanket of a colonial settlement. Castlereagh supported the building of the fortifications, 
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but this did not translate into a “blank-check” for the safety of all the territories of the 
Low Countries. As time went on, Castlereagh grew wary of entangling guarantees on the 
continent. He said later that the guarantee on the Low Countries was “an engagement 
fundamental and inseparable from our policy,” while the guarantee of forts against 
France was “incidental and auxiliary, a mere question of expediency, of means to an 
end.”113 The purpose of the forts was not to serve as an eternal inroad of British power 
into the continent; it was to guard the Netherlands against France. 
The establishment of a monarchy in the Low Counties with the help of 
Castlereagh and its expansion could be viewed as a conservative move on the part of 
Castlereagh, a goal to reinforce the monarchies of Europe. It is true that Castlereagh 
played a role in re-establishing the House of Orange, but the assumption of a 
conservative motive relies on a false premise: that the reestablishment of the House of 
Orange was the underlying goal of Castlereagh’s actions. If Castlereagh only wanted to 
reestablish Orange, he would have no need to strengthen it with territory from the 
Austrian Netherlands, would not have tied it with such a loose constitution, nor would he 
have invested so much effort in providing it with the means to better resist France. 
Castlereagh fought for more territory for the Netherlands, but did not manage to provide 
it with all he had hoped.114 The constitution binding the Prince of Orange was not 
empowering, it was similar to that of the King of England. Castlereagh could have fought 
for a more conservative model, similar to the rest of the monarchic states on the 
continent, with greater power invested in the Prince. He did not pursue this goal, 
however; instead, he built a more liberal state to better placate the Prince’s new subjects. 
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Some still argue that Castlereagh could have been building a state like Britain, exporting 
constitutional monarchism. This argument flies in the face of his settlements in the rest of 
Europe and his opinions on the precariousness of the Prince in his new country.115  
The establishment of the fortresses along the border between France and Denmark 
does not make sense if his goals were politically conservative. The fortresses arose with 
great expense and diplomatic horse-trading. These fortresses were not a series minute 
Bastilles to bolster the Prince in a hostile state, they were bulwarks against renewed 
French aggression. In a letter to Wellington, Castlereagh lamented the lack of land given 
to the new Netherlands state, noting that “some modification may be effected, but the 
great question for them, as well as for us, is to weight what is the best security for peace, 
and for keeping the Low Countries out of the hands of France.”116 Castlereagh’s policy in 
the Netherlands did not rest on ideological goals, but on a need to build it up against 
France. 
The Settlement of Italy 
Castlereagh had a larger goal of peace and security in Europe, but the convoluted 
dynastic and diplomatic webs that covered the Italian peninsula proved to be stumbling 
blocks. The settlement of Italy following the defeat of Napoleon was complicated 
because it involved the settlement of three different questions in one region: the issue of 
Marshal Joachim Murat as king of Naples and how his removal affected plans for 
Bourbon resumption in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the restitution of the Papal 
States, and the fate of Italian settlements in northern Italy in the strengthening of Sardinia 
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and Austria.117 Murat was a destabilizing factor on the peninsula, and Castlereagh needed 
to remove him from power before he could achieve a lasting peace. In regards to the 
Papal States, the peace of Europe was not contingent on strengthening its borders. Its 
preservation and restitution was important for the purposes of guarantees and reliance on 
international law. French swift inroads into Europe had been possible in large part 
because of the political fragmentation of northern Italy. Genoa had been a comparably 
neutral state in the conflict between France and the Allied Powers, and it had hoped to 
maintain its sovereignty upon the cessation of hostilities. However, the need for a secure 
and strong buffer state in northern Italy to offset French influence involved merging 
Genoa into the Kingdom of Sardinia.118 This issue is a microcosm of the rest of the 
territorial issues in the Congress of Vienna, how Castlereagh dealt with the dispersion of 
territories and peoples to guarantee security against general warfare in Europe. 
The participation of the Italian peninsula in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars centered on the strategic importance of Italy, its history of dynastic division, and its 
military geographic dispersion. As a military and diplomatic lever, southern Italy served 
as a barrier for British interests in the Levant against dedicated French incursion, while 
northern Italy served as a potential route to Austria filled with states of mixed suzerainty 
to the Hapsburgs. The peninsula had been the seat of contest between Hapsburgs, Valois, 
and Bourbon, and the conquest of the region would serve as a crucial morale multiplier 
out of synch with its strategic value. While Napoleon had resounding success in northern 
Italy with the accruing of massive indemnities and the movement of artwork back to 
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France, southern Italy was a highly contested region. The politics in Naples were often 
confused, Napoleon’s response to the Holy See constantly shifted, and Sicily became a 
staging ground for British naval power in the Mediterranean.119 
The first inroads into Italy occurred with the peaceful annexation of Savoy and 
the more brutal conquest of Nice. Both of these incursions were at the expense of the 
House of Savoy.120 While the destruction of Rome and the defeat of Austrian forces in 
Italy were ripe targets for French forces, they demurred and refocused on German and 
Dutch territories. The most glorious victories in Italy would later fall to Napoleon.121 
Diplomatically, Italy served as a staging ground for Napoleon’s politics and further 
harassment of the Savoys. In December 1801 and January 1802, in the midst of peace 
proceedings, Napoleon took control of the Cisalpine Republic and renamed it the Italian 
Republic with himself as president. During the seizure of other states and the resettlement 
of territories, Napoleon annexed the heart of the Savoy holdings, Piedmont. The 
mistreatment of the King of Sardinia (House Savoy) was one of the reasons for Tsar 
Alexander’s renewing conflict with Napoleon. It was not that Alexander held a deep and 
abiding love for Sardinia, but Napoleon had rebuffed his attempts at mediation to the 
great embarrassment of Alexander’s personal prestige.122 Napoleon’s restructuring of the 
Italian states in the midst of peace proceedings is indicative of how fundamentally flawed 
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the early attempts at peace in Europe were after a failed coalition. While some Powers 
sought to limit the damage done to them if defeated, most went a step further and 
considered how the peace would affect the next, inevitable war. Napoleon went a step 
further and deliberately divided his holdings and vassal states in Italy into strategic and 
military districts for the raising of men and capital for the next war.123 For Napoleon, the 
peace settlement itself was a tool for winning men and resources for the war immediately 
to follow. Castlereagh’s peace at Vienna did look towards the strategic necessity of men 
and material, but it did so in the hope of maintaining peace, not of wringing the 
maximum benefit. 
In the midst of the Napoleonic Wars, Castlereagh had been privy to detailed 
accounts of Sicily, but his greater interest was in reclaiming Naples from Napoleon’s 
control.124 While he was more than willing for a local response in Naples to rise up and 
restore Ferdinand II, he thought it “should be in fact a restoration rather than an 
election.”125 A plan for a new constitution tempered the proposal for the restoration of the 
Bourbons in Naples. Later, William Bentinck tempered this view, saying, 
 My object was to secure, if possible, to this great population [Sicilian] the 
attainment of their blessings which have been placed within their reach, and 
which is of the subject of universal desire. Their incapacity to seize this desired 
liberty arises from their misfortune, and not their fault, from the nature of the 
active and debasing tyranny under which they have lived.126  
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While Castlereagh may have preferred restoration to the popular election of a monarch, 
his views on liberty and freedom (that he shared discussions on with William Bentinck) 
were sanguine for the future but wary of the dominance of another state.  
Castlereagh’s goal for Naples was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 
Sicily, reunifying the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The establishment of Murat on the 
throne of Naples hindered this plan. Though Murat participated in Napoleon’s ruinous 
campaign against Russia and fought in the French defeat at Leipzig, he survived the rout 
from Moscow—and so went on to plague Castlereagh in Italy. Sensing the changes of 
fortune as his master fled back into Germany and then France, Murat signed a peace 
agreement with Emperor Francis in exchange for 30,000 soldiers from Naples for use 
against his father-in-law.127 With the ad hoc legitimization of Murat, the issue of southern 
Italy was the choice between of the brigand-turned-king and the restoration of the 
dubiously effective House of Bourbon. Both Castlereagh and Metternich were 
uncomfortable with the settlement towards Murat, but Castlereagh said, 
[A]s Murat’s support became less indispensible, one’s repugnance to the 
arrangement in his favour increased. I still believe (however much I dislike it) 
that, even at the moment the Treaty was made, it was both wise and necessary. 
The only think that can make it palatable will be a liberal arrangement for the 
Sicilian family.128   
 
At this point in the peace process, Castlereagh’s opinions of Murat seemed to spring from 
his disappointment over the Bourbons, and from Murat’s habit of delaying peace talks to 
gain the maximum advantage.129 
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Following Napoleon’s abdication and exile to Elba, Castlereagh was in some 
difficulty as to how to proceed. He did not want the unpleasant task of dislodging Murat 
from Naples, yet having a former officer of Napoleon on a throne, especially one so near 
Elba, gave all of his peers cause for concern.130 Metternich and Castlereagh originally 
quelled their disapproval of Murat in the name of strategic necessity. Austrian fears over 
the possibility of Murat stirring trouble near its holdings in Italy and anger in the House 
of Commons over the awarding of Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia caused them to 
reconsider the issue.131 Despite some public posturing, Castlereagh pursued the removal 
of Murat through British and international channels long before Murat’s failure in the 
Hundred Days presented them with the perfect opportunity.132 Looking at Castlereagh’s 
intent and goals in southern Italy, one sees him supporting the liberty of people of Sicily 
(seen through Bentinck’s goals and sentiments on the ground in Italy), supporting the 
restoration of the Bourbons in Italy, and being wary of Murat’s control and use of 
delaying tactics for diplomatic purposes.  
Castlereagh’s goals were the preservation and betterment of the people of 
southern Italy. While modern critics, and assuredly some of Castlereagh’s peers, may 
have preferred an election of a monarch in Naples, an elected monarch would not 
command respect amongst his dynastic peers. Castlereagh’s fears over Murat seem have 
been a mixture of distrust of Murat as a tool for Napoleon and his unnecessary extension 
of conflict to get the most benefit out of a peace agreement. Castlereagh’s means were 
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strategy and diplomacy, but his goal for Europe was peace. While the entire issue of 
Italian settlement would have to wait, Murat’s defection to his master in the Hundred 
Days took the decision of unilateral British action out of Castlereagh’s hands. The 
settlements of Murat’s holdings in southern Italy did not end with the restoration of the 
Bourbons, it touched on Castlereagh’s strategic concerns for the rest of Italy.  
The issue of the Papal States at the Congress is a small matter, but it is indicative 
of the difficulties Castlereagh had in settling strategic borders in Europe with so many 
conflicting needs. The French Revolution devastated the Church within France itself. 
Rich church holdings were dissolved by the state and traditional clergy privileges were 
set aside. In the Papal States themselves, cities and territories under the authority of the 
pope fell into the hands of Revolutionary France or Napoleon. Comtat Venaissin and 
Avignon were annexed in 1791 as well as the Legations put into part of the Cisalpine 
Republic. Revolutionary France invaded the Papal States proper in 1798 and declared a 
Roman Republic. Pope Pius VI died in exile in France. Napoleon did not attack the 
trappings of the papacy, but he did annex the remainder the Papal States’ territory to 
France. Napoleon’s relationship with the papacy rested on his intemperate desire for 
control and his desire to use religion as a bulwark of his rule. Napoleon may have 
annexed and invaded papal lands, but he reintroduced reforms and restitution to the 
Church in France under his proto-police state.133 After the push of Napoleon back to 
France, Castlereagh received letters from the Papacy detailing their loyalty and the trials 
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they had undergone for the resistance against Napoleonic domination.134 While 
Castlereagh might have wanted to recompense the Papal States, he surrendered to the 
needs of balance of power concerns for Austria and the raw aggrandizement of Murat. 
While the needs of the papacy could be set aside for larger concerns, the holdings of 
Austria were paramount in Castlereagh’s plans for Italian security.  
The issue of Austria in Italy also troubled Castlereagh. At the Congress, Austria 
recouped its holdings in Lombardy and Venetia. While there had initially been hopes in 
the local populace for a respite from war and taxation, the necessity of raising levies 
against Napoleon in the Hundred Days and the slow administration of the Hapsburgs 
meant that this goodwill evaporated in fairly short order. Castlereagh was aware of the 
inefficiencies and discontent in the Austrian holdings, but he did not meddle.135 The 
territory of Austria in northern Italy needed to be filled out, and Murat delayed and 
connived to gain more territory at the expense of the Papacy. While Murat’s defection 
would make Castlereagh’s desire to reinforce the Papal States easier, the issues with the 
Papacy demonstrate Castlereagh’s limited options due to strategic concerns. Before his 
fall, Murat was a necessary tool for the defeat of Napoleon and pacification of the 
peninsula. Austrian territories, while of middling importance to Hapsburg’s long-term 
interests, were strategically necessary to secure their interests against France in Italy.  
While Austria would have some holdings in northern Italy and a restored Bourbon 
monarchy would govern in the south, Castlereagh did not think this would be enough to 
preserve Italy from the possibility of future French aggression in northern Italy. The 
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Kingdom of Sardinia had been strong enough to join the First Coalition against the 
French Republic in 1792, but Napoleon thoroughly defeated it in 1796. Castlereagh 
originally considered keeping Genoa a free city, though he long knew that any lasting 
settlement in Italy required a restoration of the Kingdom of Sardinia.136 While the House 
of Savoy held decent holdings in the Piedmont and in the island of Sardinia, it quickly 
suffered defeat by initial French incursions into the region. If Sardinia was going to be 
stronger, the city of Genoa was the likeliest target. Genoa had surrendered to 
Castlereagh’s peer William Bentinck, but only at the promise that it retain its ancient 
freedoms.137 Castlereagh entertained the idea of a free Genoa and he quickly saw that 
Sardinia’s need for expansion for the security of Italy against France meant the sacrifice 
of Genoa.138 This decision met with disapproval in Britain, but Castlereagh supported it 
in the Congress and called the Savoys back to their ancestral home in Piedmont from 
their refuge in Sardinia.139 While Sardinia had been able to assist in driving France out of 
Italy after Napoleon’s retreat, it could not effectively serve as a counter to French goals 
on the peninsula.140 Sardinia would have to be enlarged to block easy French access, to 
serve as a buffer between France and Austria, and to maintain peace in the region. At the 
Congress, the promises of Bentinck to Genoa were reneged, but their sacrifice bolstered 
the power of Sardinia.  
Castlereagh’s overall goal in Italy was the reformation of the peninsula to resist 
French military aggression. He pursued this goal through the wooing and eventual 
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removal of Murat from the Kingdom of Naples, the attempt to reinstate the Bourbons as 
kings of both Sicily and Naples, the extension of Austrian territories into portions of 
northern Italy, and the consolidation of Sardinia with the city-state of Genoa to serve as a 
buffer against France. With the rout of Napoleon from Russia and his defeat at Leipzig, 
Castlereagh desired for the war to come to an end as soon as possible. While he had often 
made use of Sicily as a platform for military action against France in the Mediterranean, 
the defection of Murat was an opportunity that he could not pass up. Castlereagh’s 
discontent grew as Murat failed to bring concerted action against his father-in-law and 
stalled for greater territorial concessions. Castlereagh wanted peace and security in 
southern Italy for the good of Europe and for Britain’s territorial interests, but planned 
with Metternich for some possible removal of Murat should the opportunity arise. 
Castlereagh was willing to forego his plan for the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples if 
it meant a secure peace under Murat. On the other hand, Castlereagh’s willingness to 
collude with Metternich for the long-term security of southern Italy demonstrated his 
deliberate goal to make a lasting peace in Europe. His attempts to put the Bourbon’s on 
the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would not have been a territorial extension 
of direct French power, but would have secured the region from the Bourbons of France; 
they would be unlikely to make war on a cadet house.  
The extension of Austrian lands into the Mediterranean and the absorption of 
Genoa were not blind aggrandizement. There was traditional Austrian authority in some 
of the regions it gained control over, and this plan would carry some form of continuity 
after twenty years of war. More importantly, the expansion into northern Italy would 
serve as a buffer against France. The traditional holdings of the House of Savoy were 
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Piedmont and the island of Sardinia. While this ancestry was enough to make a minor 
power, it could not repeal French incursions for any amount of time. The history of 
Sardinia as a local ruling power, unlike Austria, made it a natural center for the 
sentiments of the Italian aristocracy. Bringing Sardinia’s power in line with its prestige, it 
would require the city of Genoa. While Castlereagh balked at the betrayal of Genoa, he 
saw the safety of Italy, the cordoning off France, and the peace of Europe as trumping all 
other concerns.  
The Settlement of Poland and Saxony 
 The borders of Central Europe were of great importance to Castlereagh in his 
quest for peace. Prussia had to be strengthened against the threat of renewed French 
aggression and the crossing of the Rhine—the German states bulwark—had to be 
garrisoned on both banks. At the close of the Napoleonic Wars Russian forces overran 
Germany and Prussian forces eyed their neighbors with greed. Castlereagh needed to 
build up barricades against France, but he also needed to balance this goal against 
interests in Central Europe. For his lasting peace to work, Castlereagh needed to bring his 
Russia, Austrian, and Prussian allies to an equitable peace, limit Russian hegemony in 
Central Europe, and protect Prussia’s neighbors from annexation. The settlements of 
Poland and Saxony were one issue due to the territorial concerns of Austria, Russia, and 
Prussia, and their expectations and needs for security after the Napoleonic Wars. When 
Napoleon cast his eye upon the Holy Roman Empire, it was a hopelessly decentralized 
system of more than 300 states. Francis of Austria turned down the position of Holy 
Roman Emperor, despite the empire’s earlier prestige, for fear that it might act as an 
impediment to Austria’s dealings with outside powers and lesser states within the Holy 
70 
 
 
 
Roman Empire. While Napoleon had mixed contact with some of the states in Germany, 
his relationship with Saxony was more cordial, at least as far as diplomatic expediency 
was concerned. Saxony served as the site where the defeated Russia, Prussia, and other 
lesser states paid homage to Napoleon after one of his glorious victories in Central 
Europe.141  
In 1808, Napoleon established the recently elevated king of Saxony, Frederick 
Augustus I, as the Grand Duke of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.142 In proper gratitude, 
Frederick fought on the side of Napoleon against Austria in 1809. In 1813, Frederick 
received Metternich, who entreated him to turn on Napoleon, but Frederick held true for a 
time. 143 However, on the eve of the Battle of Leipzig, Frederick abandoned Napoleon 
and tried to defect to the Allies, causing the remnants of the Rheinbund state to collapse 
around him.144 Austria and Prussia prevented Frederick’s defection and held him interned 
at Schloss Friedrichsfelde.145  
The issue of Saxony’s settlement made many in the Congress diplomatically 
uncomfortable. While Frederick was indeed a king, the Great Powers entertained the 
possibility of dethroning him and giving portions of his lands to Prussia to accommodate 
them for their losses in land and souls against Napoleon.146 While the Kingdom of 
Denmark lost its subsidiary state Norway, the seizure of Saxony marked the dissolution 
of a Frederick’s house in Europe from a position of power. It is one thing to take away 
land from a dynasty, it is quite another to dissolve its holdings altogether.  However, the 
Powers had different expectations in regards to Saxony. Castlereagh originally thought 
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that the goals of Prussia were more modest in nature and that its territorial ambitions 
were limited. As he traveled with Tsar Alexander to the conquest of Paris, his 
understanding of Russian—and by extension, Prussian—ambitions in Central Europe 
grew.147 Prussia desired to see itself compensated and strengthened in Northern Germany, 
and it had calculated its due down to the last farmstead. Alexander hoped to strengthen a 
loyal Prussian protégé. Metternich feared that giving Saxony to Prussia would increase 
Austria’s borders with Prussia to a financially damaging degree, would sully Austria’s 
reputation as a protector of smaller German states, and would unbalance the relationship 
between Austria and Prussia to a fatal degree.148  
While Metternich changed his opinions on the awarding of Saxony’s territory for 
hopes of concessions on the settlement of Poland, he saw the necessity for creating a 
strong state to offset the possible machinations of France to be of paramount 
importance.149 Aptly enough, France’s interests were to keep Saxony separate from 
Prussia so that it might be able to influence the lesser German states along its own border. 
Despite this self-serving goal, Talleyrand was outspoken about the impropriety of the 
Congress deposing a monarch who “governed his subjects for forty years like a father, 
serving as an example of the virtues both of a man and of a prince.”150 The mixed support 
and opposition to this settlement in Parliament complicated Castlereagh’s options. Not 
only the British aristocracy, but the public was also uncomfortable with the idea of 
unjustly removing a monarch, and Samuel Whitebread, a Member of Parliament, called 
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the idea a treacherous partition, an act done in accordance with Bonaparte.151 At Vienna 
itself, Castlereagh mulled over the possibility of the Allies having replaced Napoleon’s 
use of arbitrary power for that of Alexander.152 While the issue of Saxony was 
complicated in and of itself, it was intertwined with how the Congress dealt with the 
partitioned Republic of Poland.  
Castlereagh’s thoughts on Polish nationalism and self-determination 
notwithstanding, he had two main goals for Poland. He wanted to settle the border in 
Europe in such an equitable fashion so as to preserve peace, and he wanted to limit the 
dangers of Russian hegemony or Austrian insecurity in Central Europe. The long history 
of Polish partition and disintegration as an independent state posed a number of obstacles 
for Castlereagh. The Kingdom of Poland was partitioned in 1772 by a supposedly 
hesitant Maria Theresa in Austria, an insatiable Frederick of Prussia, and an opportunistic 
Tsarina Catherine the Great.153 Despite the loss of land and political prestige, Poland 
interacted with other European powers from 1788 to1791. 154 In 1793, there was a second 
partition in which Russia gorged itself on eastern Poland, Prussia obtained a Polish 
corridor that linked the territories of Brandenburg and Silesia, and Austria went without 
benefit. This event increased the standing of Russia and Prussia, limited the benefit of 
Austria’s prize in the first partition, and forced Austria to tread carefully. It feared that 
Russia or Prussia would seize its holdings in Poland, a fear that limited the effectiveness 
of its response to the French Revolution.155 In 1795, Russia, Austria, and Prussia divided 
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Poland for a third time; again, Russia gained the most out of this situation. This benefit 
was less due to the territory it took from Poland and more to the increase in power caused 
by the continued rivalry and infighting between Austria and Prussia over Germany.156 
While Austria feared the loss of its Polish territories, Poland itself did not fare 
well throughout the tumults of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon 
attempted to rouse a rebellion in Poland during his campaign in the German states, but 
with little success. Following the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon set up the Duchy of Warsaw 
and offered it to Frederick of Saxony.157 After the defeat of Napoleon, no Power earnestly 
expected Poland to become its own separate kingdom with its 1772 borders, but each 
Power would discuss some change—whether it would serve to compensate Prussia for its 
losses or serve as buffer state between Russia and the rest of Europe. Russia claimed the 
Duchy of Warsaw by right of occupation, as compensation for its wartime efforts, and 
because Warsaw’s inclusion under Russian control would better gratify the Poles. While 
no one can doubt that conquest is a legitimate argument in statecraft, especially with the 
200,000 Russians in the German states, the argument over compensation is particularly 
demonstrative.  
Russia took part in a continuation of balance of power politics and 
aggrandizement through its seizure of the duchy. However, one has to take into account 
what Alexander himself said on the matter.158 He promised his friend Adam Jerzy 
Czatoryski, an exiled Pole, that he would rebuild Poland. Given the air of mysticism and 
self-importance with which Alexander surrounded himself, it is likely that the tsar 
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actively held two irreconcilable goals—that he would both govern the Poles and free 
them. He would be both conqueror and savior. Though Alexander made promises to his 
friend, he also had several meetings with Castlereagh on the issues of Poland and Saxony. 
The tsar did plan to build a Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but Castlereagh questioned whether 
this entity would be the “erection of a part of Poland into a Kingdom merged in the 
Crown of Russia, [or] the restoration of the whole or greater part of it into a distinct and 
independent state.” He also went on to point out the disruptive nature of a new Polish 
state to the holdings of Austria and Prussia, the abhorrence of this policy in the rest of 
Europe, and the burden it would lay on his own people.159 Castlereagh appealed to 
Metternich and Hardenberg check the Alexander’s goals, but met with little support while 
the issue of the Saxony settlement was in doubt.160 Confronted with Alexander’s stubborn 
responses to Poland and Prussia’s interests in Saxony, Castlereagh began to discuss the 
possibility of military action against Russian and Prussia for the preservation of balance 
of power.161 Castlereagh’s goals at the Congress were not to win a silent summer for his 
people, but rather to forge a lasting peace. His consideration of going to war with Russia 
does not undermine his goal of peace in Europe. Castlereagh did not seek after a single 
summer of quiet before war erupted once more; he sought a lasting peace in Europe. If he 
had to go to war with former allies and enemies alike to achieve this peace then he was 
willing to do so.  His enlistment of the France in this secret pact was not a reversal of his 
long-term goal of encircling France. He made use of France in the short-term while 
continuing to pursue its long-term neutralization as a predatory power on the continent. 
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The fate of the Polish Duchy of Warsaw mingled with the fate of Saxony. 
Metternich could be convinced that Prussia deserved compensation for its losses with 
lands from Saxony, or that Russia warranted rewarded for its help in the defeat of 
Napoleon. However, both halves of the plan were untenable if introduced together due to 
the strategic strain that it would put on Austria.162 If Russia and Prussia both realized 
their prospective goals, the border they shared with Austria would be over 500 miles, 
necessitating higher border security than that required to face a lesser power. According 
to this plan, Russian territory would end 175 miles from Vienna.163  
Castlereagh viewed the issue in terms of diplomatic relationships rather than mere 
borders. He hoped for a system that set a diplomatically noncommittal Britain in the 
camp of a Austria and Prussia that were against the possible growth of France and Russia. 
If Prussia was building better relations with Russia and alienating Austria, then his 
second plan involved a power block of Britain, France, and Austria against Russia and 
Prussia.164 Castlereagh’s fears of a Russian hegemony in Europe were extreme enough 
that he pursued a secret agreement with Talleyrand and Metternich in case the tsar would 
not make concessions in Poland and Saxony. This secret treaty came out during the 
Hundred Days, enraging the tsar, but also revealing to him the lengths that his 
compatriots would go for the Central European settlement. When Castlereagh continued 
to press forward in his attempt to temper Alexander’s goals in Poland, he received a letter 
back from Alexander that stated that the creation of a separate Polish Kingdom would act 
as a check to Russian power. Castlereagh pointed out that while a new Poland might be 
legally distinct from Russia, its systematic domination by Russia would serve as an 
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inroad to European politics and a stepping stone for possible military action in Central 
Europe.165  
Up to this point, the discussion of Castlereagh’s policies at Vienna have primarily 
focused on the threat of France to the tranquility of Europe. The settlements in the 
Netherlands and in Italy endeavored to strengthen them against France. The greater 
freedom that Castlereagh gave Prussia in territorial claims over Russia reflects his hope 
that a stronger Prussia could better contest France. Castlereagh’s settlement of Denmark 
(discussed later) endeavored to recompense different states in Europe who sided against 
Napoleon and weaken Denmark, who served as a long-term tool of France. Castlereagh’s 
insistence on contesting Alexander’s proposal seems to be in earnest. However, 
according to a discussion Castlereagh had with a lesser French diplomat, 
Any attempt on the part of France to make such a collateral point as that of 
Saxony a question of war, in subversion of the more important object of opposing 
a barrier to Russia, must, in all probability, not only destroy the relations with 
England, but lead to immediate hostilities.166 
 
This possible alliance with France and Austria does not undermine Castlereagh’s long 
term plans for peace in Europe; it merely demonstrates the lengths he would go to secure 
some form of lasting peace that avoided a continental hegemony.167 France was still no 
less of a danger to the peace of Europe; its power could threaten Alexander to force 
terms.168 
The threat of war between the Powers passed with their galvanization in the 
Hundred Days, the recognition of how close they came to war, the renewed war 
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weariness on the part of the statesmen, and the diplomatic prestige of Arthur Wellesley 
who traveled to Vienna to take up Castlereagh’s policies while Castlereagh traveled to 
London to present himself to Parliament.169 In the end, Prussia received two fifths of 
Saxony with a population of about 850,000 subjects as well as the fortress of Elbe. In 
exchange, Austria received Tyrol and Salzburg as well as promises for concessions in 
northern Italy and Illyria.170 Frederick of Saxony kept a portion of his realm, specifically 
some historically and strategically relevant settlements. The settlement was much less 
than the initial claim for all of Saxony, but more than Castlereagh had hoped for. 
However, Castlereagh’s stubbornness in face of Prussian desire bore fruit.171 In Poland, 
Prussia kept the province of Posen, and Austria gained the province of Galicia. The 
capital of Krakow and the surrounding area became a free city. The remainder of the 
duchy integrated into the Kingdom of Poland under Alexander.  
While price Czartoryski, Alexander’s Polish confidant, wrote the Principles of the 
Constitution of the Polish Kingdom, that outlined the kingdom’s independence, he did so 
with the clear understanding that the constitution was not inherent to the Polish people, 
but rather a boon granted by Alexander.172 The partitioning of Poland and Saxony on its 
head looks like a classic balance of power exchange of territory, and the aggrandizement 
and desire for relative gains did play a part. However, the arguments Prussia made was 
not that it had taken land from its neighbors by right of conquest, but that it had suffered 
long against Napoleon and deserved compensation for the general security of Europe. 
This claim was not just posturing on the part of Prussia. Talleyrand, Castlereagh, and 
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Metternich disliked the choice of location and the distasteful treatment of Frederick of 
Saxony, but they all saw the need for a strong Prussia to offset power in Northern 
Germany.  
Russia did gain large sections of Poland—not as direct annexation, but under the 
guise of the Kingdom of Poland. While one could argue that Alexander intended to seize 
Poland all along, his own words, and those of Czartoryski, protest that he had good 
intentions. While the seizure of Saxony and Polish lands might have been distasteful, the 
end goal was the improved security of Europe. A weakened Prussia could not offset 
France or Russia, and the existence of the Polish Kingdom—even if it was under Russian 
control—eased the tensions between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in that area.  
If Castlereagh had a failure at the Congress of Vienna it was the negation of 
Poland and Saxony. The desires of Alexander thwarted his plans for a separate Poland 
asthe king of Saxony lost a good deal of territory to Prussia. However, these local 
reversals did not cause irreparable damage for Castlereagh’s interests in a check on 
French military expansion. While Saxony suffered, Prussia increased to a size that could 
resist France. While some could argue that Russia’s inroads into Poland created the 
means for it to infiltrate every continental court, it also made Russia more receptive to the 
needs of Austria and Prussia. The territorial strength of Russia and its ability to draw 
back politically and militarily into its own vastness failed to work with its connections to 
Poland, binding it fast to Central Europe. Russia was the dominant eastern power at the 
close of the Congress, but the economic and social upheaval it was undergoing did not 
dissipate. The continued threat of unrest from Poland or the infiltration of Austrian or 
Prussian interests turned the territory into a liability rather than a benefit. While 
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Castlereagh might lament his actions in the settlement of Poland and Saxony, the buffer 
state of Prussia grew stronger, and Russia’s direct interaction in Western Europe 
increased.  
The Settlement of Denmark 
The treatment of Denmark by Castlereagh and his peers at the Congress was in 
response to territorial needs and concerns, but the troubled relationship between Denmark 
and Britain undoubtedly effected what diplomatic options were available to Castlereagh. 
The opinions and prejudices of his peers in Britain and Denmark bound Castlereagh, but 
his goal was a settlement in Europe that could ensure a lasting peace. Before the 
Revolution, Russian interests in the region depended on maintaining a status quo of 
conflict between Denmark and Sweden. Britain, on the other hand, focused on keeping 
French authority out of the region.173 If Britain supported Sweden, it indirectly followed 
that it was opposed to Denmark’s interests.  After the fall of Holland to French 
occupation, Denmark benefitted from the absence of its traditional trading rival. While 
Danish ships did benefit France, the insistence of some in Denmark’s court to contest 
Britain’s illegal searches and seizures was what caused real strife between the two 
nations. The division between the two nations increased when the British sixth-rate 
frigate Nemesis stopped a convoy of Danish vessels guarded by the Danish ship the 
Freya. Such an affront to national honor prompted Denmark to call on Russia’s aid for 
some form of action against Britain. Russia used this appeal as an excuse to call Denmark 
into a League of Armed Neutrality. Some have argued that the true purpose of the League 
was to serve as a check to British and Austrian interests and to serve as a conduit for 
further Russian influence in Central Europe to counter a Franco-Austrian peace. 
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Regardless, the British were opposed to the League as a slight to their international 
prerogative and war with France. In response, Britain led a naval force and laid waste to 
much of the Danish fleet to teach Denmark, and Russia by proxy, a lesson.174 Britain’s 
relationship with Denmark became further complicate with the siege of Copenhagen in 
1807.  
The Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 secured a peace between Russia and France and 
meant that there were fewer avenues through which Britain could attack France. 
Castlereagh was aware of this difficulty and originally considered action in South 
America and the Middle East. Eventually, he decided on an attack on Denmark to weaken 
French power in Northern Europe and to deprive France of a Danish power as a possible 
weapon against Britain.175 Napoleon had been eyeing the Danish fleet to supplement 
France’s failures in the blue-water war with Britain. Fearing that Napoleon would bring 
Denmark under his control, Castlereagh sent an expedition asking the Danes to join the 
British alliance and surrender its fleet. When they refused the overture, Castlereagh sent 
British forces to occupy the Danish island of Zealand, bombard Copenhagen, and destroy 
the Danish fleet.176  
The actions of Sweden, Denmark’s neighbor, intrinsically tied with Denmark’s 
fate in the Congress of Vienna and Castlereagh’s need to negotiate for peace in Europe. 
While the clash between Britain and France drew Denmark into danger between them, 
Sweden drew closer to Russia’s sphere of influence. In 1811, interactions between 
Sweden and Russia took the form of Russia guaranteeing support for a Swedish invasion 
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of Danish Norway, and the use of Sweden as a diplomatic lifeline between the estranged 
Russia and Britain.177 While the use of Denmark as an indirect channel of communication 
was useful, Castlereagh disliked it. Castlereagh’s preference for direct communication 
would bear fruit at Vienna and the later Congresses.178 Sweden served a similar position 
as proxy for Britain’s interests in 1813 when they joined an Anglo-Swedish Alliance to 
fight on the continent and take Norway from Denmark. While this policy may have 
seemed necessary to combat French control of Denmark, Castlereagh never cared for 
it.179 During the Napoleonic Wars, the Scandinavian states of Denmark and Sweden fell 
inbetween the clashes of Britain, France, and Russia. Denmark fared poorly; the loss of 
its shipping and its fleet, the bombing of Copenhagen, the loss of several islands, and the 
constant threats to Norway sapped them of resources. Sweden, on the other hand, 
benefitted from the patronage of Britain and Russia in turn. The connection of Denmark 
to France and the more active relationship of Britain and Russia with Sweden would play 
a part in their treatment in the later settlement. 
Castlereagh’s goal to use Sweden as a tool against Napoleon was not always 
successful. This mixed success was in part due to the confusion of the northern campaign, 
but also due in large part to Jean Bernadotte’s (Charles XIV of Sweden) desire to 
preserve his own troops for later use against Denmark.180 Born Jean Bernadotte in 
France, this military officer became a Marshall of the Empire under Napoleon. He had 
held off the British at Walcheren (interestingly enough, Castlereagh never held this 
against him) and was later offered the Swedish crown. Bernadotte’s desire in the peace 
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settlement rested on an agreement from 1812. If Sweden would join its forces with the 
last coalition, it would receive reimbursement for territories it had lost to Russia earlier in 
the Napoleonic War. This promise, along with an inability to pry Denmark away from 
France while also courting Sweden, limited Castlereagh’s options. The long-term 
connection between France and Denmark made any concessions towards Denmark 
unpopular with the British public.181 Public opinion aside, there was a fear in Britain that 
France would continue to wield great power in the Danish court even if Napoleon’s 
troops were removed from garrisoned locations.182  
While the Congress agreed to honor the promise made to Sweden and offer 
Norway as recompense, the Norwegians had their own ideas. Norway had been under the 
Danish crown for 500 years, and it did not relish the idea of transference to Sweden. In 
response to the Congresses ruling, in May 1814, Norway proclaimed its independence 
and crowned Prince Christian of Denmark its king. While Castlereagh was loath to take 
arms against Norway for this sentiment, he agreed to the Congress’s enforcement of the 
decision.183 To add further injury, Denmark never saw the lands of Northern Germany, 
Swedish Pomerania, and the island of Rugen promised in recompense for the seizure of 
Norway. Prussia, eager to expand territories lost in the wars and settlements of Napoleon, 
coveted and received Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rugen.184 
The settlement of Denmark and the reorientation of Norway to Sweden seem to 
have little to do with Castlereagh’s goals for balance of power in Europe. The 
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recompense of Sweden for the loss of Finland was necessary, however, to allow Russia to 
keep its territories in the Northern Europe. The reorientation of Norway served four main 
purposes. It kept Russia content with its seizure of Finland, which would be important in 
the arguments that Castlereagh had for the preservation of Poland and Saxony. The use of 
Denmark as a later tool for French aggression lessened with the loss of Norway, while at 
the same time rewarding Bernadotte for his actions against Napoleon. Lastly, the removal 
of Denmark’s non-continental Norway effectively increased its connection to the German 
Confederation, the alliance of German states that existed for the preservation of their 
individual sovereignty.185  
Those who might suggest that Castlereagh had dominating conservative 
motivations at the Congress ignore his support of the removal of Norway from Denmark. 
The crown of Denmark had ruled Norway for more than 500 years, and its removal was a 
clear break with European dynastic conservatism. He also ignored the call of the 
Scandinavian peoples for some form of  self-determination. While he lamented the 
necessity of foisting the Swedes—unwanted—on  the people of Norway, he supported 
the move due to the diplomatic needs of Europe and the Congress. 
Castlereagh had succeeded in bolstering the Netherlands and Piedmont-Sardinia 
against France, had made peace with Russia and Prussia in the settlement of Saxony and 
Poland, and had entrenched Austria in a supportive position in Italy. These goals were not 
due to blind reactionary motive, but were based on a realistic need to check French 
military aggression. Castlereagh’s goals were underlined with realism, but his legacy as a 
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continentally-inclined reactionary endured as Britain drifted closer—against his will—to 
the Holy Alliance. 
During the Congress Castlereagh set aside his ideals in exchange for realism and a 
belief in utilitarianism in international power politics. At the Netherlands Castlereagh 
built a stronger state that could better resist France by expanding it into neighboring 
territories and paying for fortresses between the two countries borders from Britain’s 
coffers. In Italy Castlereagh deposed Murat, revitalized a Bourbon cadet-house in the 
Two Sicilies, bolstered a stronger kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, and tied Hapsburg 
interests into the region. In Poland and Saxony Castlereagh walked a tightrope between a 
need to make a lasting peace between the Powers and a need to avoid Russia achieving 
hegemony in Central Europe and the strategic ruin of Austria. In Denmark he was forced 
to act against the values of both European Liberalism and Conservatism in pursuit of a 
territorial settlement that would pay off the allies who had assisted in the downfall of 
Napoleon. Castlereagh’s diplomatic conflicts with his peers in Vienna were heated, but 
the true test of his settlement was the actions of the Great Powers in the decades that 
followed. 
 
85 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
Castlereagh, the Holy Alliance, and Congressional Legacy 
While Castlereagh had fought a duel before in his youth in Ireland, Canning never 
fired a shot in his life. As the appointed time, approached the men readied their pistols 
and took their marks. They both walked ten paces, turned, and Castlereagh and Canning 
shot at one another. Both men missed their first shot. Castlereagh was not satisfied with 
this outcome, and on the exchange of a second volley hit Canning in his thigh. He helped 
carry Canning into the nearby house and bound up his wound. While both men went on 
to deal with high policy, war, and intrigue, their duel sticks out as a singularly 
demonstrative event. There are historians who have attempted to paint the lives of 
Castlereagh and Canning as a great conflict between opposing ideologies. In truth, 
however, the men shared the same fundamental goals of peace in Europe and prosperity 
for Britain. Castlereagh’s real legacy was not the preservation of Britain’s internal 
liberalism, or the checking of the Holy Alliance’s conservatism, but the preservation of 
peace in Europe and the maintenance of Britain’s national interest through the system he 
had arranged at the Congress of Vienna. 
 The Holy Alliance was the child of Alexander’s fears and insecurities after the 
Napoleonic Wars. The Holy Alliance was to be a union between all of the monarchs of 
Europe in a Christian accord against the forces of revolution, Jacobinism, and democracy. 
Aside from these lofty goals, Alexander also desired some form of guarantee for his 
newly seized territories in Poland. Metternich was eager for Austria to make use of the 
arrangement in spite of his personal feelings towards the Alliance, and Prussia was 
already under the influence of Russia due to strategic and personal factors. Castlereagh, 
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on the other hand had two main difficulties in the support of the Holy Alliance. The 
House of Hanover sat on the throne that had passed to them through the Glorious 
Revolution. It would be politically absurd for a monarch who sat due to revolution to sign 
a document protecting a monarch from revolution in any form.186 While this diplomatic 
approval would be politically awkward, more pressing was the incompatibility of 
Alexander’s autocratic dream for Europe with Britain’s constitutional monarchy. Even 
more absurd was the fact that King George IV of England lacked the authority to accept 
the proposal sent to him by Alexander. While the Holy Alliance was an irritant to 
Castlereagh and Canning alike, the real ideological conflict between British liberalism 
and continental conservatism came with the Troppau Protocol. The Holy Alliance 
established the Protocol in response to the revolutions in Spain, Portugal, and Naples in 
1820-1822. Russia, Austria, and Prussia formed the Protocol without the approval of 
Britain and France due to their disagreements on how to address revolutions and the role 
of the Quadruple Alliance in governing Europe. It stated that the Holy Alliance would 
have the responsibility of guaranteeing borders and squelching revolutions throughout 
Europe.187  
 The Troppau Protocol came out of a meeting of some of the Great Powers who 
met at Troppau in 1822. It was primarily concerned with the revolutions in Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, and in the Spanish Americas. Alexander, moving away from his somewhat 
liberal policies in 1815, wanted the Holy Alliance to have teeth and be responsible for 
putting down revolutions through the military means of the Great Powers.188 Britain 
protested against such a plan, stating that it would make them “the armed guardians of all 
                                                          
186
 Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, 382-385. 
187
 Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822. 285, 288, 295. 
188
 Gulick, 294. 
87 
 
 
 
thrones.”189 Castlereagh disliked the Protocol for three reasons: the precariousness of a 
world empires that might require the Alliance to suppress a revolution at a future date, 
Britain’s historical dislike of the standing army that would be required for such a venture, 
and Britain’s natural liberal tendencies. France did not support the Troppau Protocol, 
either—something that was due to its attempt to improve relations with Britain, as well as 
to its own more liberal political culture. Metternich made a particularly interesting 
provision in the Protocol, stating that a monarch could call for outside assistance from the 
other members of the Holy Alliance if their rights or sovereignty were threatened.190 This 
addendum would play off quite well for Austria in the Revolution of 1848. While the 
Troppau Protocol transformed the Holy Alliance into an active organization, it also 
widened the ideological gap between liberal Britain and France and their autocratic 
neighbors. Despite this gap, and a disagreement over the use of military force within 
Europe itself, the Great Powers did not enter into general war. The Concert of Europe 
endured the idiosyncrasies of its adherents. 
 While the Troppau Protocol gave teeth to the Holy Alliance, it did not suppress 
revolutions and maintain the peace by itself. The Austrians dealt with the revolution of 
Naples with audible support from the Holy Alliance.191 Against its pro-orthodox designs, 
Russia did not support the Greek rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.192 France 
intervened on its own, without the prompting of the Holy Alliance, moving into Spain 
and giving it a resurgence of national and military prestige at little cost.193 The Polignac 
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Memorandum ruled out military involvement by Britain and France.194 The continued 
number and severity of revolutions in Europe and the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, 
Germany, Italy, and in colonial possessions continued. These revolutions elicited ever 
more severe responses from the Great Powers, but the Concert of Europe allowed general 
peace to endure. The peace between the Great Powers ended when Britain and France 
made war on Russia for its designs on the Straits in the Crimean War. 
 The argument is that Castlereagh succeeded in surrounding France with strong 
states to resist French aggression. While it is readily apparent that he was instrumental in 
building the larger states, how does one measure the success of his efforts? The 
Netherlands, a traditional war ground in Europe, was free from invasion until the Great 
War a hundred years later. Italy did not suffer invasion from France, but Sardinia did 
accept the assistance of Napoleon III in the removal of Austrians from settlements in 
northern Italy. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden slipped into relative unimportance in the 
larger affairs of Europe. In the decades after the Congress of Vienna, French soldiers 
returned to Italy and Spain, would travel across the Atlantic, and would finally fight 
beneath the walls of Sevastopol. Yet, none of these conflicts were for the purpose of 
conquest. Though the restored Bourbons and Napoleon III fought and schemed to push 
French prestige around the world and to use their influence for greater power in Europe, 
the end goal of their ventures was not to seize estates, goods, and material for an ever 
greater war on Europe, but rather for discreet diplomatic goals. Castlereagh’s desire to 
surround France tied with the “guarantee,” the international recognition of borders and 
the rights of states. It is clear that Castlereagh surrounded France with stronger states, but 
what is not clear is if these new states were guarded by a bayonet in hand or by the lines 
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on a map. Castlereagh’s reputation among his peers did not celebrate the lasting general 
peace that he gave Britain for decades but instead abjured him for entangling Britain in 
continental conflict.   
 Castlereagh was a man of his times. He was not a Prince Metternich who led the 
post-Conference Europe about with relative ease, he was not Tsar Alexander with a holy 
mission of import. He of course had his own personal ideologies and opinions. He acted 
foolishly on an international stage in the attack at Walcheren and even more absurdly in 
his private duel with Canning. In spite of these faults, his long-term goals were not 
overawed by emotion and ideology but where the fruit of his experiences. The revolt in 
Ireland and what he had seen in France and Spa, led Castlereagh to distrust what he saw 
as the intemperate and disruptive nature of the Revolution. He advocated sorties into 
Napoleonic France and brought the Allies together in the last coalition. While the Treaty 
of Paris succeeded in securing Britain’s immediate territorial concerns, Castlereagh took 
the negotiations to Vienna with the intent of securing a lasting peace in Europe and a 
bulwark against French aggression. He supported the strengthening of the Netherlands 
and Piedmont-Sardinia; reestablished stable dynasties in Italy; and resettled Saxony, 
Poland, and Denmark to secure a peace with the other Great Powers. While he made 
decisions that glossed over the needs and desires of voiceless peoples in disputed 
territories, his goal was never the reestablishment of autocratic control, but the security of 
Europe and a lasting peace. Castlereagh’s endeavors at Vienna and his attention to 
political realism secured a peace for Europe that lasted until the Crimean War and 
tempered the upheaval of the continent until the Great War. 
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